Plenary coverage - European technological sovereignty and digital infrastructure 2025/2007(INI)

From authorship to anonymity: Æ's story of how the 'Knafo Report' gave way to a collective effort, uniting voices from the PfE to the Greens.

This report could have been known as the 'Knafo Report,' yet it ultimately eluded its original parentage to become a collective and impersonal endeavour. We will be following Madame Knafo’s European trajectory with keen attention, to see whether her liberal or sovereigntist leanings will prevail — though we remain unconvinced that a true reconciliation between Knafo and Europe is within reach.

Introduction

Appointed on December 3, 2024, Sarah Knafo (ESN) was designated as rapporteur within the Committee on Industry, Research and Energy (ITRE).

On February 25, 2025, the draft committee report was officially registered under reference PE768.180, marking the formal launch of parliamentary work on this own-initiative procedure concerning subject 3.30.06, Information and communication technologies, digital technologies.

Subsequently, on March 21, 2025, two distinct series of amendments were submitted in committee, under references PE770.267 and PE771.891, illustrating the depth of debate and the strong desire among Members of the European Parliament to reshape the initial draft.

The procedure culminated with the submission of the final committee report to plenary for single reading on June 11, 2025, under reference A10-0107/2025. This marked the formal end of the preparatory phase before the plenary vote.

And yet, there will be no “Knafo report.”

It is well known how significant an eponymous report can be within the informal cursus honorum of high-ranking French civil servants—a tradition from which Sarah Knafo herself originates.

Unfortunately, this report will not grant her that symbolic distinction. The final report, as it stands, is so extensively amended that it virtually fuses the remnants of the original text with three converging counter-reports: those of the PPE, Renew, and S&D groups, along with key input from the Greens. In contrast, the positions of the PFE have been sidelined, and The Left declined to participate altogether, objecting to the political affiliation of the rapporteur.

In the end, this outcome is emblematic of how the European Parliament functions—an impersonal process where collective amendments override the symbolic authorship initially carried by a prominent political figure.

There will be no Knafo report. Until her next file as rapporteur, we hope in 2026. Perhaps one day there will be a European Tech Sovereignty Act—but only if she can muster the political weight to carry it at the European level. Hopefully, she will have learnt from her first report.

She has strong link the French administrative elites. Getting closer to the European Council and the Council of Europe might help her, as well as her links in the French consulting and political counseling environement.

However, her last amendements on the Gas storage ahead of winter took a more sovereignist turn.

Remember that Sarah Knafo started her political commitment in a euro-critical left/right student group named “Critique of European reason¹”. She helds in high esteem the Gaullist-Sovereignist Marie-France Garaud, euroskeptical MEP from 1999 to 2004, affiliated to the Appel de Cochin².

Sarah Knafo is aware of the tension between her liberal outlook—which implies more single market integration, greater capital mobility, lower taxation of profits, and regulatory simplification—and her sovereigntist outlook, which seeks to reassert the primacy of the French state and return to the spirit of the European Commission (creating a market-based environment) and of intergovernmental “joint cooperations.”

With the approach of the 2026 presidential election, she will likely shift her focus to the domestic arena and step back from European affairs—engaging with them only insofar as they help shape her national political persona.

What direction will her future positions take? Will she take on another report? If so, we would track it with the same precision, hoping for an outcome more substantial than this one. A trial run, perhaps—but we strangely expect more from an elected official of her stature.

Whatever her national ambitions, and whatever her sovereigntist-liberal orientation—which stands apart both from the more integrationist PPE-S&D-Renew axis and from the PfE axis, which is more cautious on financial issues and more “nationalising” on industrial matters—who knows where her opportunities will lead her?

This review has made it possible to explore several areas. First, the examination of declarations of interest, which allows for an analysis of the institutional influence surrounding this text—both in terms of general “recommendations” and more specific “demands.”

This review has also made it possible to examine a particularly dense package of amendments (460 in total), featuring highly substantive individual contributions (from Jörgen Warborn, the Greens, S&D, Renew, PfE), whose critical mass effectively formed a series of “counter-reports” that, for better or worse, managed to carve out a place in the final report.

This is an opportunity to make explicit the spontaneous ideology of the various groups with regard to digital infrastructures and their sovereignty. Each of these groups carries its own vision—sometimes compatible, sometimes contradictory. It is essential to understand how certain micro-formulations found their way into the compromise text, which has been substantially expanded and revised.

One can sense the result of extensive committee work.

The compromise text lends itself to a dual analysis: first, in relation to the draft report, and second, in relation to the final amendments.

In fact, the compromise text goes well beyond the draft, giving it the appearance of a document that has become autonomous from its original rapporteur. Furthermore, a micro-analysis of the contributions that made the transition from the 460 amendments to the compromise allows us to trace the various “counter-reports” that have been grafted onto the “skeleton” of the initial report.

In terms of the textual genealogy of parliamentary documents, this text is a perfect case study.

Then, of course, there is the political analysis surrounding Sarah Knafo—her position in relation to the text, her ability to lead committee work, with its meetings, collegiality, punctuality, endless comments, and the interpersonal relationships with other MEPs that this kind of work necessarily entails.

Overall, we at Ave Europa are impressed by the work carried out, by the richness of perspectives presented, and by the granularity of the final report, which demonstrates a genuine interest in the concrete challenges facing the sector.

We agree with the definition of “technological sovereignty” as encompassing both the negative aspect of dependence and exposure to risks, and the positive dimension of creating the conditions for independence. We appreciate the quality of the work, including the “counter-reports” that have been appended to the original. The text must be rooted in the body of ITRE regulations produced in 2024, a year that was rich in content on technological sovereignty.

We look forward to the potential of a “European Tech Sovereignty Act” that brings together both horizontal and vertical approaches, to rationalise a set of texts within a leaner framework. This would make clear the systematic nature of European intervention across a cluster of interlinked technologies. Europe must think in terms of “technical systems” composed of building blocks that together form a coherent technological whole, which must be addressed in its entirety. Thus, we are pleased by the mention of the semiconductor sector, the importance of physical and technical control over communication infrastructures, protection against cyberattacks, and high-performance computing.

We support the logic of benchmarking against the US, China, and likely also India, as a guiding principle for European public policy design For Europe to become a continental bloc, it must think of itself as such and compare itself with comparable economic entities. If Europe continues to rely on inter-state comparisons, it will miss its calling as a regional area of power and prosperity.

Such a comparisons are indispensable in order to integrate digital trade partnerships with the Far East (South Korea, Singapore): A European strategy for the Far East is essential, as we are advanced industrial societies facing analogous challenge. These are societies characterised by stability, compatibility, and a modernity comparable to our own.

At times, we identify with the adversarial tone of PFE, but we favour market-based solutions in the spirit of the EPP. We support the need for economic and legal intelligence to address American extraterritoriality, the battle of standards, and the patent wars. We call for a strengthening, completion, and deepening of the Single Market, particularly in financial terms. This includes the banking union, the savings union, and the unification of European stock markets. The aim is to improve the investment capacity of European groups and increase their market valuation. Europe may define valuation standards different from the US to preserve its unique model of a social market economy

A revision of public procurement policy is essential, not as a mere discretionary prerogative of Member States, but as a strategic tool for guiding industrial supply. There is a pressing need to mobilise private capital to reduce the investment gap. We express a preference for market-based approaches, portfolio diversification, movement towards a European Nasdaq, and pan-European harmonisation and interoperability

Derogatory criteria for mergers and concentrations should be considered to enable the emergence of European giants. This must include a European-specific approach that preserves the principle of creative destruction. We acknowledge the importance of large groups, whose R&D efforts are structurally more sustained than those of smaller players. We also stress the need to maintain smaller actors with strong potential for disruptive innovation.

The European Union must create the conditions for a protective blue ocean in the face of monopolistic dynamics driven by global giants—not to stifle internal competition, but to preserve a red ocean of healthy emulation, driven not by protectionist measures but by incentive-based mechanisms that foster investment and innovation. An attractive patent policy, scale-up agreements that ensure fair remuneration for start-ups, and safeguards against predatory early acquisitions should form the foundation of a resilient and competitive European ecosystem.

The issue of skills is critical. We must attract, repatriate, train, and retain our talent and expertise. Space is a crucial issue, and it is time for Europe to deliver faster and on a larger scale. Targeted deregulation measures are needed to accelerate the building of gigafactories. We support more cross-border cooperation and joint undertakings. We support the coupling of decarbonisation and digitalisation to create a mutually reinforcing effect between the two sectors, while supporting a nuclear-first energy mix to sustain the energy intensity of the sector.

Declaration of interets:

Studying the details of declarations of interest is important to understand, first, the industrial actors who have a vested “interest” in Europe and consider it necessary to engage with parliamentary action; and second, the personal networks of the MEPs, which can be inferred from the stakeholders they agree to meet or those they choose to prioritise directly.

Alexandra Geese

As part of her role as shadow rapporteur within the ITRE committee, Alexandra Geese has declared a wide range of interests, reflecting her engagement in the fields of digital policy, civil society, research, and innovation. Her declarations include interactions or affiliations with the following entities: Airbus, the Centre for European Policy Studies, Deutsche Telekom, the European DIGITAL SME Alliance, Stiftung Mercator, and iivii. She has also listed technological and environmental actors such as CSC – IT Center for Science Ltd., Ecosia, the Open Search Foundation e.V., Mastodon, Ionos, and Nextcloud.

Her commitment to digital rights and citizen participation is evident through connections with ARTICLE 19, Access Now Europe, Alliance4Europe gGmbH, the European Bureau of Consumers' Unions, the Council for European Public Space, European Digital Rights, the Europeana Foundation, the Irish Council for Civil Liberties, Make.org, People vs Big Tech, the UCL Institute for Innovation and Public Purpose, the Commons Network, the Mozilla Foundation, Utrecht University, the Foundation for European Progressive Studies (FEPS), and Waag Future Lab.

Also included are the European Startup Network ivzw, the Innovate Europe Foundation, iconomy, the Future of Technology Institute, the Weizenbaum-Institut e.V., the Wikimedia Foundation, the Sovereign Tech Fund, the University of Geneva, and the Bits & Bäume collective.

Alexandra Geese’s socioeconomic networks are notably diverse, spanning civil society, academia, and the open-source technology ecosystem, with minimal direct alignment to large corporate or state-industrial power structures. She is also connected to public interest research bodies like the UCL Institute for Innovation and Public Purpose, the Commons Network, Waag Future Lab, and Utrecht University.

In addition, Geese engages with open-source and decentralised tech actors (e.g. Mastodon, Nextcloud, Open Search Foundation) often seen as alternatives to surveillance capitalism or monopolistic platform economies.

On the economic front, her ties to entities like the Sovereign Tech Fund and the European DIGITAL SME Alliance suggest an emphasis on small and medium-sized enterprise development, as opposed to reliance on hyperscalers or venture capital-dominated ecosystems.

Altogether, her network sketches a socioeconomic vision aligned more with redistributive and democratic values than with top-down industrial or market liberal strategies.

Jörgen Warborn

In his role as shadow rapporteur within the Committee on Industry, Research and Energy (ITRE), Jörgen Warborn (EPP) declared numerous interests reflecting a close connection to the digital sector, telecommunications, energy, and the European innovation ecosystem.

Among the listed technology and telecom companies are Telefonica S.A., Cellnex Telecom S.A., Ericsson, Deutsche Telekom, Microsoft Corporation, Google, Amazon Europe Core SARL, Orange, Telenor, Open Fiber, OVH Groupe, Vantage Towers AG, Safespring AB, Palo Alto Networks Inc., MVNO Europe, ECTA, the European Telecommunications Network Operators’ Association (ETNO), GSMA Europe, CISPE Cloud, the Information Technology Industry Council (ITI), and CentR – Council of European Top Level Domain Registries.

He has also met with or declared interest in organisations such as AK Public Affairs, CCIA Europe, ADAN, Connekt, CSC – IT Center for Science Ltd., the European Data Centre Association, Free Software Foundation Europe e.V., and Creativity Works!, an organisation he references multiple times.

His attention to innovation and European technological sovereignty is demonstrated through engagements with AMADEUS IT Group S.A., Mirakl, Ledger SAS, the Future of Technology Institute, Volvo Car Corporation AB, as well as with industrial representation bodies such as Teknikföretagen and, recurrently, the Confederation of Swedish Enterprise.

He also cited organisations related to consumer protection and digital policy, such as the Consumer Choice Center Europe. These declarations reveal a broad network of interlocutors covering the entire digital value chain—from infrastructure and cybersecurity to data services and connectivity.

Jörgen Warborn’s network of declared interests reveals a socio-economic alignment with corporate-led innovation, market liberalism, and a transatlantic technological ecosystem. This suggests a deep entrenchment in the interests of incumbent infrastructure and platform providers, favouring economies of scale, cross-border deregulation, and capital mobility. His regular engagement with entities like the Confederation of Swedish Enterprise and Teknikföretagen further highlights his proximity with internal, Swedish economic affairs.

Sarah Knafo

In accordance with Article 8 o,f Annex I to the Rules of Procedure of the European Parliament, the rapporteur, Sarah Knafo, has declared having received input from a range of individuals and organisations during the preparation of her draft report on European technological sovereignty and digital infrastructure.

Sarah Knafo’s declared interactions suggest a dual socio-economic logic of positioning between national anchoring, and European leverage.

As rapporteur within the ITRE committee, Sarah Knafo declared a series of meetings and exchanges in the transparency register, reflecting a strong interest in digital sovereignty, cybersecurity, and industrial policy.

She met with Thomas Balladur, co-founder and CEO of Interstis³, as well as Marc Darmon, chair of the Strategic Committee for the Security Industry sector (Thales). Her focus on cybersecurity is also evident in her discussions with Marc Watin-Augouard, a recognised expert in the field (cercle K2), Christian Harbulot, director of the School of Economic Warfare (École de Guerre Économique), and Olivier de Maison Rouge, a business lawyer specialising in economic intelligence.

From the side of major digital companies, she met with Bruno Giorgianni, chief of staff to the CEO and director of public affairs at Dassault, along with representatives from Meta, including Anton’Maria Battesti, Director of Public Affairs France, and Simone Gobello, Public Policy Manager.

From outside the European sphere, the rapporteur consulted with representatives of major US technology companies. She engaged with Thomas Volmer, Global Head of Content Delivery Policy at Netflix, and Teodora Raychinova, Senior Public Affairs Manager at the company.

On 27 January 2025, she met with Roberto Viola, Director-General of DG Connect at the European Commission, highlighting the importance of institutional engagement in the course of her mandate. She also relied on the European Parliamentary Research Service (EPRS), providing a formal EU-level perspective.

Other notable interlocutors include Léonidas Kalogeropoulos, a French public affairs consultant and executive at the Open Internet Project (OIP)⁴; Jean-Paul Smets, CEO of Rapid.Space⁵; and Thomas Fauré, founder of the secure social network Whaller⁶.

Taken together, these interactions reflect a focus on European technological sovereignty, strategic innovation, and public–private dialogue on digital transformation

The list, taken as a whole, reflects a strong French presence, particularly from the fields of economic intelligence, cybersecurity, and technological sovereignty.

Notably, only two institutional EU entities—DG Connect and the EPRS—appear on the list, indicating that while the report was produced within a parliamentary framework, its intellectual and policy direction leaned heavily on external expertise, with a strong Franco-centric orientation.

This positions her within a tradition of economic sovereignty rooted in statecraft, shaped by the French doctrine, combined with selective engagement with large tech firms (Meta, Netflix, Dassault).

Michał Kobosko, Francesco Torselli, Aleksandar Nikolic Elena Sancho Murillo, Alexandra Geese

As shadow rapporteur, Elena Sancho Murillo declared a meeting with Telefonica S.A., while Alexandra Geese, in addition to her many other declarations, reported an exchange with Dynamo S.p.A. and Schwarz Unternehmenskommunikation International GmbH as part of her parliamentary work.

For his part, within the ITRE committee, Michał Kobosko (Renew) declared engagements with a diverse range of actors from the technology, digital, telecommunications, and energy sectors. These include major entities such as Hydrogen Europe, Microsoft Corporation, Deutsche Telekom, and GigaCloud, as well as sectoral representatives like Związek Pracodawców Technologii Cyfrowych Lewiatan⁷, BEUC, BEREC, the Independent Regulators Group, the Motion Picture Association, the European Competitive Telecommunications Association, ETNO, DCGG, and the Financial Times.

Francesco Torselli (ECR), also a shadow rapporteur in the ITRE committee, met with representatives from influential organisations and companies in the fields of telecommunications, cybersecurity, and digital technologies. He declared exchanges with Zoom Video Communications, Inc., Meta (through Simone Gobello), CCIA Europe, Vodafone Belgium SA, Mobile Virtual Network Operators, CENTR, ADAN, EUDCA, as well as individuals, demonstrating a wide range of consultations with both industrial and institutional interest representatives.

Finally, Aleksandar Nikolic engaged in discussions with strategic French and European actors in the fields of energy, maritime cybersecurity, and defence, including Orange, EDF, Naval Group, France Cyber Maritime, the French Telecommunications Federation, and ADAN.

Modelisation of the policy orientation of the draft report

On 25 February 2025, the European Parliament’s Committee on Industry, Research and Energy (ITRE) submitted a draft report entitled "On European Technological Sovereignty and Digital Infrastructures" (reference 2025/2007(INI)). This text, prepared as part of the 2024–2029 legislative term, bears the signature of Sarah Knafo, appointed as rapporteur. The document, registered under reference PE768.180v01-00, is a non-legislative initiative (INI) aimed at outlining the European Parliament’s position on major strategic issues related to the Union’s ability to control its critical technologies and to develop resilient and sovereign digital infrastructures.

The report is composed of several structured sections. The motion for a resolution of the European Parliament, presented at the outset, proposes concrete policy guidelines aimed at strengthening the EU’s technological independence. It is followed by an explanatory memorandum, which elaborates on the strategic context, geopolitical and economic challenges, and the priorities identified by the rapporteur in addressing current digital issues. Finally, an annex lists the entities or individuals from whom the rapporteur gathered input throughout the preparation of the report, in accordance with the European Parliament’s transparency rules.

This draft report is set against the backdrop of growing global technological rivalries and Europe’s critical dependencies on non-European actors. It aims to lay the foundation for a more coherent, autonomous, and sustainable European digital strategy, encompassing sovereignty in data, cloud services, networks, electronic components, and the development of a competitive innovation ecosystem.

The report describes its own purpose as follows: “This report analyses the main weaknesses in European strategic infrastructure. It goes on to make recommendations for rapidly achieving technological sovereignty based on competitiveness and the protection of strategic markets.”

In essence, it positions itself not merely as an assessment of vulnerabilities but as a roadmap for forward-looking policy action. The emphasis is placed on combining economic competitiveness with the strategic safeguarding of critical digital assets, suggesting that sovereignty cannot be achieved without both robust industrial capabilities and regulatory assertiveness.

The report is based on a foundational understanding of technological sovereignty and digital infrastructure. Technological sovereignty is presented as the capacity of the European Union to ensure its independence and security by safeguarding strategic infrastructure and minimizing reliance on external—particularly non-European—technology providers.

It encompasses the ability to autonomously design, develop, manufacture, manage, and secure the full range of digital systems and components. This includes both hardware and software critical to data centres, high-performance and quantum computing, cloud infrastructure, artificial intelligence, semiconductors, cybersecurity frameworks, and communication networks. This conceptual framework serves as the backbone of the report's analysis and recommendations.

This report builds on recent major European initiatives on competitiveness and digital transformation, notably the Draghi report (“A Competitiveness Strategy for Europe”, September 2024) and the Letta report (“Much more than a market”, April 2024), both of which call for a profound overhaul of Europe’s economic and industrial model. It also draws on several key communications from the European Commission, including the Digital Compass 2030 (2021), the Competitiveness Compass (January 2025), and the 2024 State of the Digital Decade progress report, which together provide an updated analytical framework for shaping the Union’s digital policy agenda.

The draft report pays particular attention to the semiconductor sector, in light of the European Chips Act (2023), which is considered one of the cornerstones of the EU’s digital reindustrialisation strategy. Cybersecurity constitutes another central focus of the report, supported by a recent regulatory framework: the NIS 2 Directive⁸ (2022), the Cyber Solidarity Act⁹ (2024), and the legislation on cybersecurity for digital products adopted in 2024 and 2025¹⁰. The report also incorporates the findings of ENISA’s 2030 foresight report on cyber threats.

Digital infrastructures are addressed from both a strategic and investment-oriented perspective, notably through the Commission’s White Paper of 21 February 2024¹¹, which examines Europe’s ability to manage its critical digital infrastructure needs. References are made to regulations governing long-term investment funds, opening the door to new financing mechanisms for the digital transformation.

The report also highlights the legal risks associated with the extraterritorial reach of U.S. laws, citing the Cloud Act, FISA, as well as legislation related to national preference (Buy American Act) and economic regulation (Executive Order 13771). It warns against strategic digital dependencies outside the EU.

The fiscal, energy, and competition dimensions complete this overview: the text refers to the Parent-Subsidiary Directive on cross-border group taxation¹², the 2019 Electricity Market Regulation¹³, as well as rules on merger control and state aid—particularly in relation to IPCEIs¹⁴ (Important Projects of Common European Interest).

Through this report, the Parliament aims to contribute to a coherent vision of European technological sovereignty, based on security, competitiveness, controlled market openness, and strategic investment in critical infrastructures.

a situation of critical strategic dependence

The report begins by highlighting a situation of critical strategic dependence for the European Union in the digital domain. It underscores that the EU is significantly reliant on foreign—particularly American—technologies, which exposes it to both operational and legal vulnerabilities. A key area of concern is the cloud computing sector, where the majority of data generated within the EU is stored or processed outside its borders, often by non-European providers.

The European cloud market is overwhelmingly dominated by U.S. companies, a concentration that presents two major challenges. First, there is a structural dependency: the EU currently lacks the autonomous capacity to meet its own fast-growing digital infrastructure needs. Second, and more critically, there is a juridical vulnerability: under U.S. laws such as the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act (FISA) and the CLOUD Act, American authorities have the power to access data managed by U.S. technology firms—even when that data is physically located on servers within the EU. This extraterritorial reach undermines the EU’s digital sovereignty and raises serious concerns about data protection, privacy, and control.

the semiconductor sector

Another critical component of Europe's technological dependency is the semiconductor sector, which the report identifies as a strategic industry in which the EU is significantly lagging behind. The European Union currently lacks state-of-the-art fabrication facilities capable of producing the most advanced semiconductors—those smaller than 10 nanometres—placing it at a considerable disadvantage in global technological competition.

At present, Europe accounts for only 10% of global semiconductor production, a stark contrast to Taiwan’s 54% share, largely dominated by TSMC, and China’s 16%. This imbalance highlights the EU’s vulnerability in a supply chain that is both geographically concentrated and geopolitically sensitive. The report underscores that without decisive investment and industrial coordination, Europe risks remaining dependent on external suppliers for the chips that power everything from smartphones and medical equipment to artificial intelligence and defence systems.

control of communication infrastructure

The report identifies control over communication infrastructure as a strategic imperative for the European Union, essential not only for enabling efficient data circulation but also for ensuring resilience against external threats in the context of growing geopolitical tensions and hybrid warfare, notably from actors such as Russia. Europe’s vulnerabilities are particularly evident across three critical domains of connectivity:

• Terrestrial infrastructure: The European Commission’s White Paper of 21 February 2024 highlights persistent shortcomings in the deployment of digital infrastructure. These include insufficient fibre-optic coverage across many regions and delays in the rollout of standalone 5G networks, which are key to enabling next-generation connectivity and industrial innovation.

• Subsea infrastructure: With 95% of international communications transmitted via undersea cables, the integrity of this infrastructure is vital. While Europe does maintain a global industrial presence through Alcatel Submarine Networks (ASN)—which holds roughly one-third of global market share—the recent sabotage incidents in the Baltic Sea have exposed a worrying lack of resilience and security preparedness.

• Space-based infrastructure: In the domain of satellite communications, the contrast with global competitors is striking. The U.S.-based Starlink already operates over 4,000 satellites in low Earth orbit, providing global broadband coverage, while the EU remains in the planning and design phase of its own LEO (Low Earth Orbit) constellation, highlighting a significant technological and strategic gap.

cyberattacks

These structural weaknesses leave the EU exposed to cyberattacks, sabotage, and foreign interference. The report notes a sharp increase in the frequency and impact of cyber incidents targeting European businesses.

According to the 2023 Hiscox Cyber Readiness Report, 58% of companies in Germany and 53% in France reported being victims of cyberattacks, up dramatically from previous years. Such statistics underline the urgency of reinforcing Europe’s digital infrastructure to withstand the realities of hybrid threats and ensure strategic autonomy.

quantum computing

Among the areas where Europe has a clear advantage, the report highlights quantum computing and high-performance computing (HPC) as key assets. The EU’s Quantum Flagship programme, supported by €1 billion, positions Europe as a serious player in quantum technologies.

In parallel, the EU continues to expand its HPC capabilities, which are essential for scientific research, AI development, and industrial innovation. These strengths are seen as critical pillars of Europe’s future technological sovereignty.

toward market-based solutions

As a path forward, the report leans toward market-based solutions, emphasizing the need to close the investment gap to regain technological sovereignty. Rather than relying primarily on public subsidies, it advocates for greater private investment in research, development, and the growth of European tech companies.

A key example is the underutilised potential of European pension funds, which hold over €3 trillion in assets. Yet, according to the European Central Bank, they allocate only 0.02% of these assets to venture capital, compared to 2% for their U.S. counterparts. Mobilizing even a fraction of this capital could significantly boost Europe’s innovation capacity. In 2021, the European Union accounted for only 7% of global investment in AI, compared to 40% for the United States and 32% for China. The gap has only widened since: in 2023, Europe invested around €5 billionin AI, while the United States invested €20 billion.

6 recommendantions

The report concludes, in its explanatory statement, with six key recommendations:

1. Recommendation 1: Private institutional investors should be encouraged to invest in a diversified portfolio of European technology companies with strong potential by simplifying the regulatory framework of the European Long-Term Investment Fund (ELTIF 2.0), by promoting mergers and acquisitions and, where the EU has competence, by offering tax incentives.

2. Recommendation 2: European public procurement should be reformed to allow Member States to restrict their strategic procurement procedures to European companies that meet sovereignty criteria.

3. Recommendation 3: The ‘high’ level of EUCS certification should be aligned with the SecNumCloud certification requirements.

4. Recommendation 4: European regulations that make assets considered to be risky and emerging less attractive by imposing high capital requirements and a prudential principle that is too strict should be reformed.

5. Recommendation 5: Two regulations should be removed for each new regulation created in strategic sectors, based on the model of the US ‘One-In, Two-Out’ Executive Order.

6. Recommendation 6: The European electricity market should be reformed by putting an end to the merit order mechanism, which aligns prices to the most expensive resources, and by re-establishing a context in which nuclear can supply competitive and stable electricity.

the two policy triangles of the Knafo report

These six recommendations can be interpreted as forming two intertwined triangles, each representing a cluster of interrelated strategic levers. Together, they structure the report’s dual focus on financial-market sovereignty and regulatory-strategic autonomy.

The first triangle centres on mobilising capital and creating favourable market conditions. Recommendation 1 addresses investment mobilisation by proposing measures to channel private capital—particularly from institutional investors and pension funds—into European technology firms, using simplified ELTIF regulation, tax incentives, and support for mergers and acquisitions. Recommendation 4 complements this by advocating for a reform of financial regulations that currently discourage investment in emerging sectors due to overly strict prudential constraints. Recommendation 5 rounds out this triangle by introducing a deregulatory mechanism—a “One-In, Two-Out” principle—to reduce unnecessary burdens on strategic industries and improve agility. This triangle as a whole focuses on capital access, risk tolerance, and regulatory efficiency.

The second triangle revolves around strategic autonomy and infrastructure control. Recommendation 2 calls for a reform of public procurement rules to enable Member States to prioritise European suppliers that meet sovereignty criteria, thereby aligning public spending with geopolitical resilience. Recommendation 3 supports this by proposing the alignment of European cloud security certification with the stricter French SecNumCloud framework, aiming to raise cybersecurity standards across the Union. Recommendation 6 addresses the foundational issue of energy by recommending a reform of the electricity market to move away from merit order pricing and restore conditions in which nuclear power can deliver stable and affordable electricity—essential for powering strategic digital infrastructure. This second triangle reinforces autonomy through procurement, regulatory standards, and control over energy resources.

Together, these two triangles form a coherent policy structure. The first secures the financial and economic environment necessary for technological growth; the second strengthens the strategic pillars that underpin sovereignty. Their interconnection lies in a clear premise: capital without sovereignty is exposed, while sovereignty without capital is unsustainable. In essence, the report proposes a dual strategy—unleashing investment flows towards European tech industries, while simultaneously protecting and reinforcing strategic sectors through targeted regulation and long-term planning.

Analysis of the draft report

Europe’s strategic dependency on foreign technologies.

The text builds its case by drawing heavily on the explanatory statement’s central theme: Europe’s strategic dependency on foreign technologies. It opens with a stark assessment—"The European Union is currently heavily dependent on foreign technologies. This reduces its capacity for strategic action and its economic competitiveness."

The report explicitly warns of the consequences: Europe’s overreliance on foreign-developed and foreign-controlled infrastructure, especially from the US and Asia, undermines its sovereignty, competitiveness, and capacity for independent strategic action. This vulnerability is especially acute in strategic sectors such as cloud services, cybersecurity, artificial intelligence, semiconductors, and communications infrastructure.

This dependency and investment gap, already limiting in normal conditions, becomes even more pressing in light of geopolitical development. Looking ahead, the US Stargate Project, launched under the new Trump administration, aims to mobilise a staggering $500 billion over four years for AI and other key digital sectors. This level of commitment stands in stark contrast to the fragmented and underfunded efforts seen across the EU.

The link between Europe's state of dependency and the United States' level of strategic autonomy is most clearly illustrated by the investment gap. While the EU continues to rely heavily on foreign technologies, it invests far less in critical sectors.

The figures are particularly revealing: 92% of the West’s data are stored in the United States, and US companies control 69% of Europe’s cloud market, compared to a mere 13% for European providers. This imbalance is not just commercial—it represents a profound geopolitical risk and an urgent challenge for the EU’s digital future.

the United States as benchmark

Beyond economic competitiveness, the report stresses the legal and security implications of this dependence. As it notes, "It also exposes [the EU’s] sensitive data, in particular due to US extraterritorial laws." In particular, reliance on US-based infrastructure places vast amounts of European data within the reach of American legislation, which grant US authorities access to data stored or processed by American companies—even when located outside the United States.

The text repeatedly uses comparisons with the United States as a benchmark, underscoring the scale of the gap in investment, policy ambition, and regulatory strategy. One of the most striking disparities is in the field of artificial intelligence (AI).

In regulatory terms as well, the report urges the EU to take inspiration from US models. It explicitly calls on the European Commission to adopt a deregulatory approach in strategic sectors, invoking the ‘One-In, Two-Out’ Executive Order once used in the United States. This would mean removing two existing regulations for every new one introduced—an effort to reduce bureaucratic obstacles and accelerate innovation in high-tech industries.

Published in February, around the time of Trump’s second inauguration, the text must be read through the lens of the pro-American fervour that had gripped French conservative circles at that particular moment.

lack of control over supply chains and communication infrastructures

The loss of technological control over both components and finished products is ultimately a consequence of a deeper structural issue: Europe’s lack of control over global supply chains. This vulnerability was starkly exposed during the recent global semiconductor shortages¹⁵, which led to widespread factory closures across key industries. With the EU accounting for only 10% of global microchip production, it remains heavily dependent on external suppliers for essential technologies, leaving its economy exposed to disruption and strategic pressure.

This lack of control over supply chains and technological components directly impedes Europe's ability to digitalise its infrastructure and invest effectively in its digital future. Despite the strategic importance of connectivity, fibre optic networks currently reach only around 64% of EU households, and so-called ‘high quality’ 5G coverage extends to just 50% of the EU's territory. These structural delays reflect both underinvestment and regulatory rigidity. In response, the report urges the Commission to facilitate the roll-out of 5G by easing restrictions on market concentration, thereby enabling greater infrastructure sharing and accelerating deployment.

The report stresses that strengthening Europe’s digital infrastructure depends on a sustainable and competitive energy policy, as digital systems—especially data centres, cloud services, and high-performance computing—are highly energy-intensive. However, persistently high energy costs are undermining the ability of European companies to compete.

These costs act as a structural barrier to investment and scale. In response, the report calls on the Commission to reform the European electricity market, notably by ending the merit order pricing mechanism, which links electricity prices to the most expensive sources. It also advocates reinstating a policy framework in which nuclear energy can provide stable and competitively priced electricity, essential for sustaining Europe’s digital ambitions.

The report strongly emphasises the principle of data sovereignty, reaffirming that sensitive data must be hosted on infrastructure that is fully sovereign and shielded from the reach of foreign extraterritorial laws. To this end, it calls on the Commission to align the ‘high’ level of the European Cybersecurity Certification Scheme for Cloud Services (EUCS)—still under negotiation—with the SecNumCloud certification used in France. This alignment would ensure that only cloud providers not subject to extra-European jurisdictions can qualify for the highest level of certification, thereby reinforcing Europe's control over its critical data and digital infrastructure.

reorienting public support and incentivising private investment

The report adopts a liberal approach to reorienting public support, emphasising the need to use public procurement as a strategic tool to advance Europe’s technological sovereignty. It calls for reserving a share of public procurement for European companies, transforming state spending into a lever for stimulating innovation and strengthening domestic capacity.

While this approach is already common in sectors like defence, the report argues that it should be extended to emerging digital technologies. International comparisons are telling: in China, all public procurement contracts in strategic sectors are awarded to domestic firms; in the United States, the figure reaches 70%, supported by instruments such as the Buy American Act and the Small Business Act.

In contrast, in some EU Member States, only 8 to 12% of public procurement procedures benefit European companies. Drawing on the recommendations of the Draghi report, the text advocates for the introduction of an explicit minimum quota for local production, positioning public buyers as “launch customers” for new European technologies and encouraging early-stage market formation

The report also offers a pointed critique of how public funds are currently allocated, arguing that scattering small subsidies across too many projects prevents any of them from achieving true critical mass.

This fragmentation dilutes impact and undermines Europe's ability to build global champions in strategic sectors.

Instead, the report advocates for more focused, strategic investment, emphasising the role of public procurement as a powerful lever to support R&D and strengthen European players in key technological fields such as cloud infrastructure, cybersecurity, artificial intelligence, semiconductors, and communication networks. Only by concentrating resources and aligning them with industrial priorities can the EU hope to close the competitiveness gap and regain technological sovereignty.

The report stresses the urgency of reforming European public procurement, calling for changes that would allow Member States to restrict strategic tenders to European companies that meet clearly defined sovereignty criteria. This would enable public funds to support the development of domestic technological capabilities, rather than reinforcing foreign dominance.

At the same time, the report calls for a reduction in direct public spending by promoting public-private partnerships as a more efficient means of mobilising investment. Echoing the Letta report, it highlights the potential of such partnerships to attract private capital while limiting the burden on public finances.

The report highlights market fragmentation as a structural weakness of the European digital economy, noting that many European businesses struggle to offer globally competitive solutions in the face of powerful international players. This fragmentation not only limits scale but also impedes investment and innovation. In response, the report calls on the Commission and relevant parliamentary committees to foster public-private partnerships and to facilitate access to private financing for European technology firms.

It also urges regulatory reform to enable life insurance providers and pension funds to invest in strategic and emerging sectors such as cloud infrastructure, cybersecurity, artificial intelligence, and semiconductors. Specifically, the report recommends easing capital requirements and rethinking overly rigid prudential rules that currently discourage investment in higher-risk, high-potential assets, thereby undermining Europe’s ability to scale its tech ecosystem.

The report outlines a series of liberal, market-oriented solutions to reinforce Europe's technological sovereignty while stimulating competitiveness and investment. It stresses the importance of financial and tax incentives as effective tools to encourage private sector investment, particularly in strategic and emerging technologies.

However, the report is also critical of the regulatory environment, arguing that complex and burdensome European regulations increase costs for local businesses without effectively challenging the dominance of foreign tech giants. It calls for a broad simplification drive, aimed at reducing administrative barriers and encouraging growth.

Citing figures that show over 60% of EU companies see regulation as a key obstacle to investment, and 55% of SMEs name regulatory burdens as their main challenge, the report aligns itself with recent findings in the Draghi and Letta reports, both of which point to regulatory complexity as a structural weakness holding back European innovation and scale.

The report also calls for greater possibilities for market concentration as a means to support scale-ups and the emergence of globally competitive European tech players. It specifically requests that the Commission and the relevant committees of the European Parliament review the legal framework governing Important Projects of Common European Interest (IPCEIs) to allow for exemptions in cases of strategic mergers and acquisitions, provided the project addresses a clear sovereignty-related objective.

This approach reflects the view that achieving technological sovereignty will require not just innovation, but also scale, and that current competition rules may need to be adapted to enable the formation of strong European champions in key sectors.

460 Committee amendments

The report on European technological sovereignty and digital infrastructure, adopted on 11 June 2025 under procedure 2025/2007(INI) by the Committee on Industry, Research and Energy, and authored by Rapporteur Sarah Knafo, stands out for the depth and breadth of its content. Compared to earlier drafts, the final PR_INI version is significantly more substantial and enriched, reflecting the intensity, seriousness, and analytical depth of the parliamentary work that informed it. Far from being a symbolic or declarative exercise, the report demonstrates the European Parliament's growing engagement with the strategic dimensions of technological autonomy and its role in shaping Europe's digital future.

Renew Amendments:

Additional citations

Seven references have been removed and twenty-one new citations have been added. These amendments aim to update and reinforce the legislative foundations of the text by incorporating references to key instruments adopted between 2023 and 2025, particularly in the areas of digital policy, cybersecurity, and artificial intelligence.

Several key references have been removed from the initial draft of the report, reflecting a significant editorial shift. Notably, Article 4 of the Treaty on European Union (TEU)¹⁶, which outlines the principles of shared competences between the Union and the Member States, has been excluded, signaling a step away from a strict legal grounding of the digital sovereignty discourse.

The amended report introduces a significant array of new references that reshape and update its legislative and strategic framework, reflecting the fast-evolving European digital agenda. Among these, the addition of the 11 February 2025 Commission Work Programme (A Bolder, Simpler, Faster Union) provides an overarching political context, aligning the report more closely with the von der Leyen Commission’s final-year priorities.

A more precise reference to Regulation (EU) 2024/2847, this time explicitly cited under its known name, the Cyber Resilience Act, reinforces the emphasis on cybersecurity as a foundational requirement for digital infrastructure. This is further complemented by the inclusion of Regulation (EU) 2019/881¹⁷, the Cybersecurity Act, which consolidates ENISA’s role and sets out the EU-wide cybersecurity certification framework, signaling an institutional anchoring of the EU’s cybersecurity strategy.

Strategic planning and infrastructure foresight are now supported by the 2024 White Paper How to Master Europe’s Digital Infrastructure Needs(COM(2024) 81 final), which builds upon and partially replaces earlier, now suppressed, references such as the Commission’s 2024 infrastructure paper and the previous 2021 Digital Compass. This is reinforced by the addition of the Joint Communication of 21 February 2025 on the EU Action Plan on Cable Security¹⁸ (JOIN(2025)9 final), which introduces a geostrategic layer to the digital discussion by highlighting the vulnerability of subsea infrastructure.

The inclusion of Regulation (EU) 2021/1173 on the European High Performance Computing Joint Undertaking¹⁹ reaffirms the strategic dimension of computing capacity as a sovereign infrastructure.

The most extensive addition, however, is a new bloc of legislative references spanning from 27a to 27k, which together constitute the core of the EU’s digital policy architecture as of mid-2025. These include the Digital Markets Act²⁰ (Regulation 2022/1925), the Union Space Programme²¹ (Regulation 2021/696), and the Union Secure Connectivity Programme²² (Regulation 2023/588), each indicating secure data infrastructure, competition policy, and space-based assets.

The list also incorporates the Data Act (Regulation 2023/2854)²³, the Gigabit Infrastructure Act²⁴ (Regulation 2024/1309), and the Interoperable Europe Act²⁵ (Regulation 2024/903), texts that highlight how data governance, infrastructure deployment, and administrative coordination are being legislated with renewed ambition. The European Digital Identity Framework²⁶ (Regulation 2024/1183) and the Artificial Intelligence Act²⁷ (Regulation 2024/1689) further confirm that trust, identity, and AI governance now stand at the heart of the Commission’s priorities.

Additionally, older but still structurally relevant texts such as the Commission’s 29 January 2020 Communication on the secure deployment of 5G and the European Electronic Communications Code²⁸ (Directive 2018/1972) are brought back into the fold, ensuring continuity between successive phases of EU telecom regulation.

Altogether, these new citations transform the report from a relatively limited political declaration into a fully integrated overview of the European Union’s legislative corpus on digital infrastructure and technological sovereignty. They also signal a deliberate choice by the majority in the ITRE committee to root their strategic ambitions in enforceable law and shared instruments rather than broad strategic declarations alone.

Deletions and additions of recitals

In the latest round of proposed amendments, one core recital from the original draft—Recital A, which defined technological sovereignty as the ability to master strategic technologies essential to Europe’s economic, security and political independence. This deletion is counterbalanced by the introduction of four new recitals which anchor the concept of sovereignty in concrete vulnerabilities and capacities.

On issue on dependence, new Recital B a emphasises that the European Union relies on foreign countries for over 80 percent of its digital products, services, infrastructure and intellectual property, directly underscoring the extent of the EU’s external dependence in the digital domain. This is further developed in Recital B b, which warns that EU critical infrastructures, including electronic communications networks, remain dependent on equipment from high-risk suppliers, thereby exposing the Union to significant security risks and undermining its technological sovereignty.

Recital B c introduces a more constructive dimension by recognising the strategic potential of open source software to contribute to trust and the EU’s technological sovereignty. Recital G a, meanwhile, refocuses the debate on human capital, underlining the urgent need for the Union to strengthen digital skills among its citizens and to train ICT²⁹ professionals capable of developing and maintaining secure European digital infrastructures. Finally, paragraph 13a emphasises the importance of attracting global digital talent to fuel innovation and reinforce Europe’s capacity to lead in critical technologies.

Paragraph 1b defines European technological sovereignty in operational terms, placing emphasis on the EU’s capacity to act independently in developing, governing, and securing key digital technologies. Amendment 251 from the Renew group marks a clear alignment with the growing European consensus on the need to de-risk critical infrastructure from high-risk third-country suppliers. The amendment calls for dedicated legislation to systematically exclude such vendors. This positioning represents a notable evolution for Renew, traditionally cautious on interventionist measures, now openly endorsing a security-first approach.

This is extended in paragraph 1c, which stresses the strategic necessity of mastering digital infrastructure, and in 1d, which calls for sovereignty to be linked with clear public oversight, adequate financing, and long-term supervision. Paragraph 1e urges a coordinated European approach to these challenges, rejecting fragmented national responses in favour of an integrated continental strategy.

Further additions explicitly bring the European space programme into the debate. Paragraphs 1f and 1g underscore the geostrategic importance of systems such as Galileo, EGNOS, and space situational awareness capabilities, framing them as essential pillars of sovereignty. Paragraph 2a (bis) specifically applauds the development of the EU’s secure communications platforms GOVSATCOM and IRIS², situating them as core enablers of independent digital capabilities. Paragraph 4c calls for connectivity policies that are sovereignty-designed, while paragraph 4d advocates for a European Space Act to structure and regulate the growing space services economy.

Paragraph 1h introduces the requirement that critical infrastructures—digital, orbital, or terrestrial—must fall under European jurisdiction to ensure security and legal control, especially in the face of extraterritorial risks. The infrastructure dimension is expanded in paragraph 2a, which broadens the definition of critical infrastructure to include subsea cables, satellite constellations, cloud computing networks, and data centres. Paragraph 4a highlights the convergence of telecoms, cloud, and edge computing as a strategic priority and supports open architecture models such as Open RAN. In paragraph 4b, spectrum policy is reframed as an investment lever, with licences positioned as instruments for advancing European digital goals.

Cybersecurity is another focal point. Paragraph 8a outlines a clear demand to strengthen ENISA, expand its mandate, harmonise national cybersecurity regimes, and revise the 2019 Cybersecurity Act. This reflects the post-2024 regulatory push captured in the Cyber Resilience Act and related proposals. Paragraph 9i explicitly defends the need for European sovereignty in digital payments through support for the digital euro, as part of a broader strategic independence agenda.

On governance and investment, the new paragraphs sharpen institutional expectations. Paragraph 3a demands ex ante impact assessments before introducing new legislation that might affect digital infrastructures or technological sovereignty. Paragraph 4e asserts the importance of fair competition within the internal market, signalling resistance to monopolistic or state-favoured distortions.

The opening additions focus sharply on sovereignty and market concentration. New paragraph 1a raises concerns over the dominance of large global tech firms, underlining the structural risks of market dependence. Amendment 406 introduces a fiscal innovation within this framework, suggesting a targeted levy on Very Large Online Platforms (VLOPs) as a means of financing Europe’s digital infrastructure. Together, by embracing risk-based exclusion mechanisms and targeted taxation, these two amendments illustrate a Renew group increasingly comfortable with policy tools traditionally outside its core liberal doctrine.

A major innovation lies in the development of a European technological stack³⁰. Paragraph 9a introduces the concept of a sovereign and resilient European Digital Stack. Paragraph 9f calls for seamless interoperability between public and industrial platforms. In paragraph 9h, international collaboration is encouraged under the framework of the UN-led Digital Public Infrastructure initiative, while the stack’s full deployment is envisioned by 2030. Paragraph 9b supports a decentralised governance model based on open standards and built-in security. Paragraph 9c insists that this stack prioritise deployment in strategic sectors such as energy, health, and defence. Paragraph 9d identifies public and private funding, along with public procurement, as essential tools to support this effort. In paragraph 9e, the need for data platforms of public interest is established, particularly in domains such as health and environment.

Amendment 235 critiques the strategic neglect of semiconductor technologies within existing Commission documents such as the Competitiveness Compass and the Clean Industrial Deal. It signals dissatisfaction with the limited attention given to these core technologies, particularly in light of escalating global competition. The amendment calls for a more ambitious follow-up to the Chips Act. Amendment 155 outlines the proposal for a European Quantum Act, drawing inspiration from the existing Chips Act. This flagship proposal reflects Renew’s ambition to position Europe not merely as a participant, but as a global leader in quantum technology.

Amendment 145, tabled by Bart Groothuis, Engin Eroglu, and Christophe Grudler on behalf of the Renew group, stresses the need for a proactive trade policy, urging the EU to adapt or create new trade defence instruments capable of countering the effects of extraterritorial pressure and asymmetric competition—implicitly referencing the assertive strategies of actors like China and the United States.

EPP Amendements

The amendments introduced by the European People’s Party (PPE) reflect a calculated effort to reposition the draft report within the evolving framework of EU legislative and strategic instruments adopted between 2021 and 2024. Rather than introducing ideological rupture, these changes aim to reinforce institutional continuity, ensuring that the report is not only politically relevant but also technically aligned with the Union’s latest digital policy architecture.

The updated recital structure of the report reflects a major narrative shift and a redefinition of its strategic priorities. Eight initial recitals have been removed, marking a clear break from earlier framings. The deleted elements include the standard definition of technological sovereignty centred on autonomy in strategic technologies, as well as a number of diagnostic references: the EU’s dependency on foreign infrastructure, particularly from the United States and Asia, the dominance of US cloud service providers and the associated legal risks under the US Cloud Act and FISA, the shortage of semiconductors and Europe’s limited production capacity, poor fibre and 5G coverage across the Union, the growing number of cyberattacks targeting European firms, the high cost of energy for digital infrastructure, and the previously acknowledged role of public procurement in supporting European tech actors.

The PPE’s amendment strategy does not amount to a unified counter-report, but rather forms a structured constellation of complementary approaches, anchored in shared priorities. Across the group’s internal diversity, a coherent strategic recalibration emerges—one that shifts from defensive notions of sovereignty to a vision of strategic autonomy built on investment, infrastructure, and industrial policy.

This vision is articulated around four functional pillars: innovation as the engine of sovereignty; public infrastructure as a lever of resilience; the internal market as a platform for competitiveness; and emerging technologies (DLT, AI, quantum) as vectors of strategic investment. What unifies these approaches is a clear rejection of regulatory fragmentation and external dependency, coupled with an emphasis on operational, market-compatible tools of governance.

Within this broader convergence, three internal trends structure the PPE’s contributions:

The first is innovation-driven sovereignty, championed by Aura Salla, Katri Kulmuni, and Christian Ehler. This line foregrounds agility, investment, and global competitiveness as the foundations of European digital sovereignty. It emphasises regulatory simplification and flexibility (Am. 148, 255, 418, 422), the promotion of private investment and venture capital alongside faster R&D-to-market cycles (Am. 234, 241, 244, 387), and strategies to attract talent, startups, and scale-ups within the EU (Am. 250, 252). Sovereignty, in this view, is reframed as economic attractiveness and innovation leadership.

The second trend is pragmatic technological sovereignty, driven by Christian Ehler, Victor Negrescu Popescu, Axel Voss, Angelika Niebler, and Hildegard Bentele. This current focuses on infrastructure capacity and strategic sectors, advocating for a technically grounded approach to sovereignty. It supports investment in critical infrastructure (Am. 429, 430, 454, 456), the creation of a European Digital Public Infrastructure to enhance resilience and interoperability (Am. 436, 442), and targeted measures in key sectors such as sovereign cloud, AI, HPC, 5G, blockchain, and semiconductors (Am. 450, 461, 462, 432). Sovereignty here is not framed in centralist or federalist terms, but as the Union’s strategic capacity to act decisively in priority domains.

The third trend is a technophile emphasis on blockchain and distributed ledger technologies (DLT), led by Stefan Berger. This orientation sees DLT as a structural component of the EU’s digital architecture, with numerous amendments focused on blockchain applications, zero-knowledge proofs, and bespoke regulatory tools (Am. 54–59, 123, 437, 444, 449, 452). It promotes initiatives like the European Blockchain Services Infrastructure (EBSI) and underlines the role of digital identity, decentralisation, and tech sovereignty in Europe’s future.

The resolution also advances the idea of open internationalism under European terms. Paragraph 2a proposes establishing new Trade and Technology Councils with strategic partners, modelled on the existing EU-US and EU-India frameworks. Paragraph 2b calls for faster progress on digital trade agreements with countries such as Korea and Singapore, while paragraph 2b bis stresses the importance of anchoring Single Market principles in all future digital regulation, drawing directly on the insights of the Letta and Draghi reports.

Paragraph 2c promotes multilateral engagement through the G7, OECD, and WTO to shape global norms on data governance, artificial intelligence, and technical standards. Paragraph 2c bis highlights the need to evolve from a connectivity-first approach to a genuine Single Market for electronic communications. Paragraph 2d endorses the Commission’s digital infrastructure white paper and its proposals for a 3C Network (Connectivity, Capacity, and Cybersecurity), while paragraph 2d bis advocates for a permanent WTO agreement on e-commerce to prevent new tariff barriers in the digital sphere.

Twelve additional paragraphs further structure the resolution around three thematic pillars: digital infrastructure, advanced technologies, and secure connectivity. The new series of amendments significantly expands the resolution’s structure by introducing twenty-one new paragraphs across four major strategic themes: high-performance computing and artificial intelligence, semiconductors and cloud infrastructure, quantum technologies and cryptography, and interoperability, data sovereignty and energy efficiency.

In terms of infrastructure and connectivity, the report now includes detailed demands for the upcoming Digital Networks Act³¹ to guarantee high-quality connectivity across the EU, including rural regions. It recognises the EU’s relative delay in artificial intelligence deployment and its implications for competitiveness. The updated text also stresses the need for risk assessment of foreign suppliers in distributed energy networks and calls for a European Cloud and AI Development Act to secure critical infrastructure and promote domestic providers.

Proposals to accelerate fibre and modern wireless deployment are matched by calls to prioritise direct fibre connections and to integrate deployments with public works to reduce costs and delays. The Gigabit Infrastructure Act is highlighted as a key instrument to facilitate very high-capacity networks through infrastructure sharing and administrative simplification. Acknowledging the essential role of private investment in 5G, 6G and edge computing, the resolution further endorses the implementation of a single permitting platform across Member States. Regarding cybersecurity and radio spectrum, there is a clear demand for EU-level coordination on spectrum policy, with an emphasis on readiness for 6G and harmonisation of licensing strategies.

Space-based communications also receive enhanced attention. Satellite systems are now recognised as vital for extending connectivity to remote areas, with the added benefit of reducing strategic dependency. The resolution calls for accelerated development of the Ariane 6 launcher and increased private investment in satellite systems such as IRIS²³². While noting latency limitations, it still advocates for greater integration between satellite and terrestrial networks, particularly for 5G and 6G.

In the domain of high-performance computing and artificial intelligence, the text now calls for continued integration of supercomputing resources to train AI models. It highlights regulatory uncertainty as a significant barrier for 21 percent of EU enterprises and urges a clearer industrial deployment strategy for supercomputers. Proposals include the creation of AI gigafactories to provide accessible infrastructure for startups, prioritisation of AI chip supply in digital industrial policy, and resolution of export restrictions affecting 16 Member States. The text also proposes an earlier-than-planned revision of the Chips Act to reflect evolving AI hardware needs and calls for scaling up InvestEU and AI gigafactories to secure Europe’s position in AI training and quantum computing. A new section also highlights the need for a European post-quantum cryptography strategy to secure long-term data protection.

Finally, the text introduces key language on interoperability, data sovereignty and energy efficiency. It supports sector-specific data-sharing ecosystems and aims to protect SMEs from abusive practices by dominant platforms. It calls for interconnection of data centres to enhance service continuity, prioritisation of platform interoperability in line with the Data Act, and the elimination of vendor lock-in. Environmental goals are embedded through a call for carbon-neutral data centres by 2030, with a focus on heat reuse, energy-efficient design and continued R&D.

In their place, the newly added paragraphs reflect a more measured ambition: to simplify regulatory burdens for digital companies, stimulate private investment, and secure a stable energy supply tailored to the needs of Europe’s evolving digital infrastructure. This updated framing favours pragmatic industrial policy tools over ideology, anchored in competitiveness and resilience.

The first group of additions centres on regulatory simplification and support for businesses. The text welcomes the introduction of the Business Wallet³³ as a digital interface that eases interactions between companies and public authorities, especially for SMEs.

It calls for a comprehensive simplification package that includes the GDPR and AI Act, aimed at cutting compliance costs for the digital industry. The principle of Better Regulation³⁴ is reaffirmed, with a strong emphasis on ex-ante impact assessments focused on competitiveness, mid-sized firms, and innovation potential. The establishment of regulatory sandboxes³⁵ for artificial intelligence and emerging technologies is proposed to allow for controlled experimentation in lighter regulatory environments.

The report also supports the creation of a 28th optional legal regime for cross-border digital activities³⁶, targeting barriers in licensing, taxation, and data flows across the single market. Finally, it introduces a new performance metric for future digital regulations: for every euro of additional regulatory cost, two euros in existing burdens should be removed, adapting the previously rejected “1-in, 2-out” principle to a cost-based logic more appropriate for EU policymaking.

The second thematic cluster addresses the energy underpinning digital infrastructure. One paragraph demands a reliable, sufficient, and long-term energy supply tailored to the data economy, recognising that energy access is now a prerequisite for digital sovereignty. Another promotes the development of a European standard for small modular nuclear reactors (SMRs)³⁷, valued for their flexibility and compatibility with data centres, cloud computing infrastructure, and quantum technologies. This reflects a strategic interest in aligning energy and tech sovereignty. Lastly, the principle of technological neutrality³⁸ is reaffirmed in relation to energy sources, ensuring that future regulation supports all viable paths to secure the digital sector’s energy needs without prescribing any particular technological solution.

ECR Amendements

Francesco Torselli’s amendments to the draft resolution on European digital infrastructure and technological sovereignty present a clearly articulated and ideologically consistent vision rooted in economic nationalism, industrial competitiveness, and a strong emphasis on strategic autonomy. His proposals, submitted under the banner of the European Conservatives and Reformists (ECR), delineate a sovereignist roadmap for the digital transformation of Europe. Structured across key thematic priorities, they call for regulatory simplification, targeted support for critical infrastructure, and an assertive investment strategy aligned with Europe's industrial interests.

A central axis of Torselli’s contributions is the call for greater control and security over Europe’s critical infrastructure, especially in areas deemed sensitive to geopolitical pressure and foreign interference. Amendment 8 and Amendment 335 explicitly welcome the European Commission’s Action Plan on submarine cable security³⁹. They not only endorse the plan’s preventive and resilience-oriented components but also go further in calling for investment in European technologies, including undersea repair vessels and autonomous underwater vehicles. These measures are intended to mitigate the physical and strategic vulnerabilities of Europe’s underwater data arteries, viewed as vital lifelines of the continent’s digital sovereignty.

Amendment 447 reinforces this strategic framing by stipulating that data centres and critical digital entities should be granted energy prioritisation in crisis scenarios, effectively positioning them on the same level as hospitals or national security infrastructure. These proposals aim to secure the physical and energy resilience of Europe's digital backbone.

On telecommunications and the future of the EU regulatory framework, Torselli positions himself as a forceful advocate of deregulation to stimulate investment. Amendments 301 and 373 frame the upcoming Digital Networks Actas a unique opportunity to simplify the telecom framework, eliminate barriers to cross-border investment, and harmonise licensing regimes across the EU.

His proposals urge a move away from fragmented national constraints toward a leaner European regulatory approach. Amendments 308 and 420 request a 25% reduction in regulatory burdens in the telecom sector and demand transparent, public impact assessments before any new measures are adopted. Amendments 380 and 383 warn against Europe’s delay in deploying next-generation infrastructure, particularly standalone 5G networks critical for industrial use cases. For Torselli, such delays not only jeopardise competitiveness but risk permanently relegating the EU to a subordinate position in the global digital hierarchy.

Torselli’s economic approach is built around strategic support for private investment, avoiding overreliance on state aid. Amendments 9a, 9b, 410, 412, and 416 propose targeted private investment in very high-capacity networks (FTTH), edge computing, artificial intelligence, strategic cables, and critical components. These sectors are identified as core to Europe's reindustrialisation and its return to technological relevance.

In Amendment 395, he proposes a clear policy of copper-to-fibre migration, recognising that maintaining outdated networks diverts resources from future-proof technologies and slows down ROI for investors. Amendment 400 calls for a reinterpretation of EU competition policy to allow for domestic telecom mergers, fostering the emergence of European champions able to compete with global tech conglomerates. This approach balances liberal market principles with a sovereignist industrial agenda.

On the matter of sovereign cloud computing and cybersecurity, in Amendment 361, Turselli challenges the imposition of political or non-technical criteria such as those embedded in the SecNumCloud standard, suggesting that they could distort the EUCS (European Cloud Certification Scheme). Instead, he advocates for technological neutrality and legal clarity, notably in Amendment 365, where he calls for a precise definition of what constitutes sovereign cloud infrastructure within EU law.

Amendment 398 introduces a proposal for European preference clauses in public procurement, which would favour domestic or EU-based providers without entirely closing the door to global value chains. This blend of protection and realism signals a competitive sovereigntyframework that acknowledges the complexity of global interdependence while defending Europe’s strategic interests.

The social dimension of Torselli’s amendments is less expansive but not absent. Amendment 440 acknowledges the negative effects of digital exclusion on economic competitiveness. He draws attention to vulnerable groups such as young people, the elderly, and those affected by “digital illiteracy” (illectronisme), calling for inclusive strategies that bridge the digital divide. His framing situates digital inclusion not only as a social good but as a structural requirement for a functioning and competitive digital single market.

Strategically, Torselli’s broader vision is affirmed through Amendments 152 and 233, which reassert that telecommunications networks form the foundation of European technological sovereignty. He links this to the broader agenda of European reindustrialisation through very high-capacity infrastructure (Amendment 390) and reiterates the connection between infrastructure modernisation and strategic competitiveness (Amendment 395).

Altogether, Francesco Torselli’s amendments form a coherent, ideologically sovereignist contribution to the legislative process. His proposals reflect a belief in European autonomy built through market-oriented but politically guided mechanisms. He emphasises regulatory simplification, protection of critical infrastructure, and incentivised private investment for Europe’s digital sovereignty.

S&D Amendments

The S&D amendments rejects the initial formulation of technological sovereignty outlined in Amendments 61 and 141, adopting instead a critical stance on dependency upon foreign platforms and emphasizing the necessity of infrastructure under European control, referencing Amendments 2b, 2c, 2d, 2f, and 2aa. It advocates for technology designed explicitly to serve public interests, positioning itself against monopolization by foreign corporations.

Additionally, the text underscores the alignment between digital transformation and climate objectives, including advocating carbon-neutral data centers (Amendment 2ac), strict energy regulations (Amendments 2h, Hc, Hd), and promoting net-zero public digital infrastructure (Amendment 2ad). Emphasis is also placed on digital inclusion policies aimed at vulnerable populations (Amendments 2f, 2g), ensuring equal access to digital services (Amendment 2aa), and addressing territorial digital equity (Amendment 2p).

The text explicitly supports establishing a sovereign, federated, open, and ethically driven European Digital Stack (Amendment 2ad), integrating cloud services, open-source software, artificial intelligence, interoperability standards, and decentralized governance structures. Further, it encourages significant public investment in European-owned data centers, artificial intelligence, high-performance computing infrastructure, and sovereign digital networks (Amendments 2u-2z).

It strongly critiques non-European Big Tech firms, specifically naming GAFAM and explicitly targeting Elon Musk’s Starlink (Amendment 102). This includes advocating for mandatory interoperability standards, rigorous oversight of critical infrastructure (Amendments 2n, 2x, 216), and strengthening European industrial autonomy, including within the space sector (Amendment 216).

Finally, the document emphasizes European standardization as a geopolitical strategy (Amendments 118, 3a), urging comprehensive EU regulatory leadership and coherent implementation of critical frameworks such as the AI Act, NIS2 Directive, and GDPR (Amendment 2z). It also advocates introducing clauses of European preference (Amendment 3b) and imposing stricter conditions on funding (Amendments 2s, 3a, 3b).

Overall, the amendments represent a clear social-democratic vision of digital sovereignty that emphasizes inclusive digital literacy, equitable social transformation, environmental sustainability aligned with digital advancement, and democratic governance prioritizing citizen rights and collective benefits. This stance distinctly opposes the neoliberal-protectionist approach associated with certain factions within the PPE group (e.g., Warborn), and the nationalist outlook represented by ECR, instead explicitly promoting pan-European common goods.

Within the amendments submitted by the S&D Group, three coherent strategic pillars emerge, reflecting a vision of digital transformation that balances industrial sovereignty, environmental responsibility, and technological governance. These contributions form a structured attempt to define a progressive digital industrial strategy that is grounded in social justice, sustainability, and strategic autonomy.

The first and most prominent is an industrial and strategic pillar that responds directly to Europe's well-documented gaps in digital and technological sovereignty. Multiple amendments refer explicitly to the Draghi Report, notably amendments 253 and 294, highlighting the estimated €150 billion investment deficit Europe faces in its attempt to regain competitiveness. In response, the S&D Group calls for the creation of a European Sovereign Tech Fund⁴⁰ (amendment 263) to support long-term, high-impact innovation. This is complemented by proposals to strategically mobilise existing tools such as InvestEU, VentureEU⁴¹, and the European Investment Bank (amendments 256, 259, 260), ensuring that financial instruments already in place are redirected toward Europe’s critical technology needs.

The group also seeks to strengthen internal coherence within the EU’s technological landscape. Amendments 297 and 298 warn of the dangers of fragmented value chains and the ongoing risk of intellectual property leakage, particularly to actors outside the Union. These concerns are linked to broader recommendations on the standardisation of digital technologies—especially in artificial intelligence and cybersecurity (amendment 267)—and to a renewed push for full implementation and enforcement of the EU’s digital legislation (amendment 268). S&D also stresses the need for stronger safeguards in international data transfers, a reflection of their emphasis on privacy and user rights (amendment 270).

The second pillar centres on climate and energy, with the group advancing a robust agenda for a sustainable digital infrastructure, one that aligns the green transition with the demands of the digital age. A series of amendments (274 to 277) focuses on energy planning for data centres, calling for anticipatory investments in energy networks and clear prioritisation of renewable energy sources to power digital infrastructure. These proposals urge the European Commission to develop a specific regulatory framework that integrates the energy intensity of the digital sector into broader climate targets. Amendment 275 insists on a climate-compatible infrastructure planning model that will prevent digital growth from undermining Europe’s decarbonisation goals. Furthermore, S&D supports the widespread deployment of fibre optics, highlighted in amendment 278, presenting it as an energy-efficient backbone for future networks.

The third pillar emerging from the S&D Group’s amendments focuses on skills and talent, seen as an indispensable condition for achieving digital sovereignty in the European Union. Through fifteen targeted amendments (279 to 293), the group outlines a comprehensive and socially inclusive approach to bridging Europe’s digital skills divide, integrating education, workforce development, and equal access across all member states.

The urgency of this agenda is clearly underlined. Amendment 282 recalls that by 2030, the EU is expected to face a shortfall of 12 million ICT specialists, while amendment 283 highlights that only 54% of Europeans currently possess basic digital skills. Compounding this challenge, amendments 284 and 285 reveal that over 60% of European businesses face recruitment difficulties due to insufficiently qualified talent. These figures are not merely cited as background—they serve to justify an ambitious policy overhaul.

The group proposes several concrete initiatives. Amendment 288 calls for the creation of a common European certification framework to harmonise skills recognition across borders. Amendment 289 suggests launching a programme to attract digital and tech talent from outside the EU, ensuring that Europe remains competitive in the global race for expertise. Additionally, amendment 291 urges the full integration of digital training pathways into all European funding instruments, ensuring that no financial opportunity is missed in the effort to skill Europe’s workforce. Finally, amendment 293 advocates for free access to digital education in all public schools, reinforcing the principle that digital literacy should be a universal right, not a market privilege.

The remaining S&D amendments further articulate this vision, reinforcing strategic priorities through specific policy interventions. Amendment 243 by Matthias Ecke stresses the importance of regional industrial clusters in the semiconductor sector, calling for territorial cohesion and local capacity building—a hallmark of S&D’s commitment to proximity-based industrial policy. In the same spirit, amendment 249 denounces the dominance of Big Tech in the AI market, exposing how a small number of non-European companies are shaping the future of AI deployment. This amendment positions S&D firmly against digital dependence, calling for fair competition and greater European control over foundational technologies.

Amendment 364 by Thomas Pellerin-Carlin adds a clear geopolitical dimension by urging the EU and its Member States to refrain from purchasing non-European satellite services for government and security applications, instead supporting the IRIS² programme as a critical pillar of European technological autonomy. This stance illustrates S&D’s broader understanding of digital infrastructure not only as an economic or regulatory matter but as a question of sovereignty and strategic resilience.

Finally, amendment 377 by Bruno Tobback and Elena Sancho Murillo proposes a gradual phase-out of copper networks, to be replaced by fibre-optic and 5G technologies. What distinguishes this proposal is its emphasis on predictability and economic realism, encouraging a planned, inclusive, and just transition that supports network operators while accelerating the shift toward sustainable and future-proof infrastructure.

Taken together, these amendments form a cohesive programme for a socially embedded, geopolitically conscious, and industrially ambitious digital transformation. The S&D Group’s vision is not limited to technological leadership—it also seeks to ensure that Europe’s digital transition is accessible, equitable, and sustainable at all levels of society. This reflects a consistent ideological commitment to strategic autonomy, public investment, territorial cohesion, and democratic control over digital infrastructure and innovation.

Greens Amendments

The amendments submitted by Alexandra Geese on behalf of the Greens/EFA Group—frequently co-signed by Elena Sancho Murillo and others—clearly constitute a fully formed counter-report, similar in structure and ambition to those advanced by Jörgen Warborn (Renew) and Elena Sancho Murillo (S&D). What distinguishes this "Geese counter-report" is its strong ideological coherence, rooted in green politics, digital sovereignty, and open-source advocacy. It presents a consistent, detailed critique of the current digital policy landscape and lays out an alternative vision based on ethical, ecological, and decentralised technological governance.

The Greens’ amendments—through Alexandra Geese’s leadership—form a dense and strategic programme aimed at redefining technological sovereignty through the dual lenses of ecological transition and democratic control. This vision insists that Europe’s digital future must be socially just, environmentally sustainable, technologically open, and geopolitically autonomous. The coherence of this contribution places it among the most ideologically distinct counter-reports to the initial draft, making it not only an amendment package but a deliberate political intervention.

Underpinning the entire corpus is a systemic critique of technological dependence and the dominant market logic. Geese identifies the continued reliance on American tech giants—GAFAM—and the symbolic capture of the digital sovereignty agenda as a form of “sovereignty washing” (1g, 1h), whereby the rhetoric of autonomy masks continued structural subordination. Her amendments argue for industrial policies that move beyond competitiveness rhetoric to genuinely enhance resilience and supplier diversity (1a, 1b, 1e).

Politically and strategically, Geese’s proposals articulate a model of green and ethical digital sovereignty that cannot be achieved without addressing Europe’s structural dependencies. This includes securing European data from the reach of extraterritorial laws like the US CLOUD Act or FISA (as reflected in amendments 65, 74, 1g, and 1r), and committing to a profound transformation of digital infrastructure. At the heart of this model is a call for strong support to open-source software, open standards, and decentralised public infrastructure (see amendments 1c, 1s, 1t, 183). These elements are not merely technical preferences—they are foundational to a broader democratic and ecological vision of the digital realm.

Amendment 71, tabled by Alexandra Geese on behalf of the Greens/EFA and co-signed by Elena Sancho Murillo, advances a comprehensive revision of the Knafo report by recasting digital sovereignty on explicitly ethical, environmental and social foundations. It blends a systematic rewrite—from the opening recitals to the industrial-policy articles—into a coherent framework that promotes European-controlled, open-source, low-carbon and socially inclusive infrastructure. The text proposes institutionalising alternative instruments such as a sovereign open-source fund, a federated European cloud and mandatory “European preference” clauses in public procurement.

In effect the amendment functions as a “Geese counter-report.” It calls for an ecologically sustainable, decentralised and democratic European digital model that prioritises cloud, AI, cybersecurity, semiconductors and procurement rules, using regulation, sovereign funds and public infrastructure to mitigate extra-EU influence, technological dependence and market capture. Geese’s position, consistent with other Green amendments, argues that user and corporate protection requires rebalancing market structures, enforcing interoperability and regulating hyperscalers, while criticising the volatility of liberal geopolitical orders. The amendment therefore reinforces a geo-legal critique of non-European cloud dependency, defends the economic rights of European actors and asserts the need for strategic autonomy in an increasingly unstable international environment.

Geese’s approach also calls for European industrial and regulatory reappropriation of key segments of the digital value chain—namely cloud computing, semiconductors, and artificial intelligence—through clearly framed European tools (amendments 165 to 174). This includes not only strengthening EU autonomy in manufacturing and deployment, but also embedding principles of environmental responsibility and social justice into digital transformation. The amendments concerning digital sustainability and circular economy (1l, 1k, Cd, Ce) align digital infrastructure with the broader objectives of the Green Deal, advancing a systemic shift toward low-carbon, resource-conscious tech development.

A notable feature of this counter-report is its call to re-regulate the cloud sector. Current frameworks are described as fragmented and insufficient. Geese calls for a harmonised European approach that supports cloud independence through coordination, federation, and technical innovation (1f, 1o, 1q). In this view, the future of Europe’s digital ecosystem depends on the establishment of non-extractive infrastructures, operated transparently and rooted in the public interest.

This amendment introduces a crucial geopolitical and strategic perspective into the resolution by directly addressing the structural concentration and dependency of the EU cloud market. It identifies that the European cloud ecosystem is dominated by just three major providers, none of which are European, and all of which are subject to non-EU jurisdictions, implicitly referring to frameworks such as the US CLOUD Act and FISA. These providers operate with decision-making centres located outside the European Union, which raises immediate concerns over sovereignty, legal control, and the continuity of service.

The amendment highlights two primary risks arising from this dependency. First, it flags the potential disclosure of data to third parties, based not on European legal standards but on foreign executive decisions, which could compel these providers to grant access to sensitive data. Second, it warns against the unilateral suspension or discontinuation of services, which may be executed for political, legal, or strategic reasons by third-country authorities—thus placing European users, businesses, and public institutions in a position of structural vulnerability.

More importantly, the amendment places this concern within a broader international context, noting the growing erosion of international legal guarantees and the weakening of contractual safeguards in the face of unilateral executive actions. This observation implies that relying on legal instruments like contracts or international law may no longer be sufficient to ensure the integrity, confidentiality, and availability of digital services provided by non-European companies.

By introducing this recital, the amendment reinforces the narrative of European technological sovereignty as not merely a matter of innovation or competitiveness but a critical security and rule-of-law issue. It frames the dependence on foreign cloud providers not as a technical or market failure, but as a systemic strategic risk, exacerbated by a deteriorating global governance environment. This aligns closely with the wider Greens/EFA counter-report logic, which promotes decentralised infrastructure, regulatory autonomy, and open-source solutions as structural responses to these geopolitical vulnerabilities.

PFE Amendments

The amendments submitted by Aleksandar Nikolic (ID/PFE) and his co-signatories articulate a structured and ideologically coherent alternative to the mainstream digital sovereignty agenda proposed in the main ITRE resolution. They collectively advance a protectionist vision for Europe's digital future—one that departs significantly from the supranational, market-driven, and multilateral frameworks underpinning current EU policy. This counter-project, grounded in the principles of strategic autonomy understood as national preference, is shaped by five key ideological and strategic axes.

Technological sovereignty re-centred on the Member States

At the heart of Nikolic's position is an explicit rejection of any federalist or supranational interpretation of technological sovereignty. Amendment 63 redefines the concept of technological sovereignty as a prerogative of national governments, challenging the growing role of EU-level governance in digital and industrial policy. This framing permeates a broader critique of dependency on third countries, particularly the United States and China. Through amendments 70, 80, and 93, Nikolic and his co-signatories express strong scepticism towards extraterritorial legislation such as the US CLOUD Act and FISA, asserting that reliance on such jurisdictions undermines European strategic autonomy.

Amendments 360, 363, and 368 reinforce this stance by demanding a strict alignment of cybersecurity and digital infrastructure policies with sovereignty-driven criteria such as those found in France's SecNumCloud. These amendments call for the systematic exclusion of foreign vendors deemed high-risk (implicitly targeting Huawei and ZTE) and for greater national control over digital resilience standards.

Strategic control of critical infrastructure

In line with their sovereignist outlook, Nikolic’s amendments place critical infrastructure at the centre of Europe’s industrial recovery and strategic independence. Amendments 6b and 382 support a mandatory “fair share” contribution from foreign platforms that dominate European data traffic—like Netflix and YouTube—as a means of both financing infrastructure and asserting economic control. Further proposals, such as amendments 6a, 6e, 13d, and 13e, identify submarine cables, strategic materials, and telecommunications networks as “vital infrastructures” to be shielded from foreign influence and placed under direct national or European control. Amendment 338 reflects this logic by denouncing the continued use of non-European office software in EU institutions, framing it as a failure of digital sovereignty and a symptom of persistent dependency on foreign vendors.

Industrial policy focused on competitiveness and autonomy

Nikolic's counter-report advocates a productivist, techno-security-oriented industrial policy. Amendments 93, 356, and 457 propose measures to strengthen the EU’s industrial base through support for robotics, critical materials recycling, and advanced manufacturing (Industry 4.0). This techno-industrialist approach is also visible in the energy domain. Amendments 11, 13a, 13b, and 13c call for a renewed embrace of nuclear power—including large-scale reactors—as a long-term energy backbone for digital infrastructure, in opposition to the more prevalent EU focus on small modular reactors and renewables. Amendment 6d introduces blockchain and Web3 technologies as key enablers of digital sovereignty, framing them as potential counterweights to existing centralised platforms and a means to regain technological agency.

Reforming public procurement and EU legal frameworks

A central pillar of Nikolic’s counter-proposal is a radically protectionist approach to public procurement. Amendments 6, 1, 162, and 168 call for public tenders in strategic sectors to be reserved exclusively for European—if not national—firms. This European preference is seen as essential for retaining strategic control and fostering domestic champions in sectors such as cloud, semiconductors, and cybersecurity.

Amendments 414 and 419 go further by demanding a complete overhaul of the IPCEI (Important Projects of Common European Interest) framework and the elimination of bureaucratic barriers that hinder rapid deployment of industrial projects. Through amendments 419, 430, and 459, Nikolic also contests elements of EU environmental and regulatory policy—such as the principle of zero net land artificialisation—arguing that they obstruct reindustrialisation and digital infrastructure deployment.

Direct identification of “digital adversaries”

Nikolic’s amendments stand out for their explicitly confrontational tone toward foreign Big Tech actors. Amendment 99 presents accusatory data concerning the share of European network traffic captured by GAFAM, using it as a rationale for regulatory and fiscal intervention. In amendments 370, 371, and 384, the authors call for a fundamental reassessment of EU competition policy to account for the market distortion effects of network monopolies and foreign platform dominance.

Finally, amendments 7a and 13g highlight the risks posed by foreign direct investment and land control in strategic sectors. They call for stricter investment screening mechanisms and land-use reforms designed to prioritise national interests and facilitate industrial repatriation.

The ideological posture of Nikolic’s counter-proposal (PFE/ID)

The collective logic of Nikolic’s amendments advances a nationalist and techno-sovereignist project that departs from the liberal, open-market orientation of current EU digital strategy. It proposes a model that is: protectionist, advocating for procurement preferences and investment barriers ; industrial and nuclear-focused, prioritising hard infrastructure, manufacturing, and large-scale energy; explicitly hostile to transatlantic and Sino-centric dependencies, highlighting risks of extraterritorial control; anchored in Member State authority, opposing supranational digital governance.

By blending industrial ambition with national preference and digital securitisation, this corpus of amendments presents a clear alternative to the central ITRE resolution and situates itself as a doctrinal platform for PFE in future digital sovereignty debates at the European level.

Amendment 150, tabled by Auke Zijlstra, Barbara Bonte, and Filip Turek (PFE), advocates for a renewed policy framework for the telecommunications sector centered on deregulation to promote growth and innovation. This amendment embodies a classically liberal-conservative stance, asserting that the lifting of regulatory burdens is a necessary precondition for economic dynamism and technological leadership. In contrast to the more interventionist approaches taken by Renew, S&D, or the Greens—each favouring structured industrial strategies, regulatory safeguards, or sustainability criteria—this proposal calls for a lighter regulatory touch, aiming to liberate market forces as the engine of growth and competitiveness.

This deregulatory framing coexists, however, with a broader and more assertive techno-sovereignist discourse reflected in a set of other amendments from the same ideological current. These additional proposals sketch out a vision of European digital sovereignty that rests not on centralised EU governance, but on national resilience, infrastructure investment, and market-driven industrial renewal.

First, the emphasis on technology and strategic sovereignty is pronounced in amendments 143, 147, 187, and 236. These stress that Europe's geopolitical independence depends on regaining control over key technologies, particularly through investment in digital infrastructure—modern fibre networks, 6G connectivity, secure satellites—and the development of European-made applications. Sovereignty here is framed not as a regulatory architecture but as a concrete capacity to act technologically, economically, and militarily without dependence on non-EU actors.

Second, the protection of critical infrastructure features prominently in amendments 333 and 393, which demand that sensitive data be hosted within sovereign infrastructures immune to extraterritorial laws. These proposals also highlight the importance of edge computing and the strategic role of Europe’s space sector in reinforcing digital autonomy, reflecting a broader security-driven logic. The shift toward decentralised architectures is presented as a response to vulnerabilities in centralised cloud structures, particularly under foreign influence.

Third, the theme of reindustrialisation and innovation as instruments of sovereignty runs through amendments 188, 245, and 388. These amendments focus on specialist training in cybersecurity law and digital economy skills, the acceleration of patent processes to foster faster deployment of innovation, and public support for start-ups to prevent brain drain. There is an overt connection made between education policy, technological leadership, and European sovereignty, reflecting a long-term ambition to re-anchor economic value chains on European soil.

Fourth, a clear critique of EU bureaucracy appears in amendments 300 and 388. These assert that current EU regulations impose disproportionate burdens on local enterprises while failing to meaningfully constrain the dominance of foreign tech giants, particularly the GAFAM firms. The solution proposed is radical simplification and the removal of perceived administrative inefficiencies, aligning with broader PFE arguments for re-nationalisation and deregulation.

Finally, a technonationalist vision of the internal market emerges in amendment 369. It calls for relaxing EU competition law to allow for more concentrated European corporate actors, with the intention of enabling the emergence of continental-scale tech champions. Cross-border cooperation is encouraged—but only insofar as it helps consolidate European players capable of resisting extra-European dominance. This logic runs counter to traditional EU market liberalism, suggesting instead a turn toward strategic consolidation and selective industrial policy with minimal EU-level oversight.

In sum, these amendments collectively reflect a PFE-aligned project that is at once market-oriented in its deregulatory ambitions and deeply sovereigntist in its strategic outlook. Unlike the green-progressive or social-democratic proposals that view the state as a planner, regulator, and steward of digital transition, this framework positions the state—or more precisely, national governments—as guardians of industrial and digital sovereignty through security investments, bureaucratic rollback, and market liberalisation. Sovereignty, here, is not only about control of infrastructure or technology but also about the ideological reassertion of national primacy within the digital single market.

III- The final report:

The comparison between the initial draft report references and the final adopted report (11 June 2025) reveals a significant expansion and deepening of the legal and political groundwork, as reflected in the list of “having regard to” clauses. This evolution shows a clear intent to anchor the final report in a broader and more detailed legislative, strategic, and geopolitical context.

The documentary framework first incorporates the Commission’s key communications and strategic reports. This corpus is complemented by a significant body of legislation. The architecture is completed by instruments on open data and interoperability. Lastly, the major financial and sectoral programmes provide the resources to deliver these ambitions. In parallel, the joint communication JOIN(2025)0009 – EU Action Plan on Cable Security, along with the State-aid criteria for IPCEIs set out in COM(2021)8481, paves the way for reform of procurement and competition law, aligned with a liberal, pro-investment agenda aimed at securing Europe’s strategic autonomy.

The initial draft consisted of a concise set of around 12 recitals (labelled A–L), each identifying key areas of vulnerability for the EU: technological dependency, weak industrial capacity (semiconductors, AI, 5G), cybersecurity risks, market fragmentation, and the misuse of public subsidies. These recitals were framed as diagnostic observations, heavily focused on EU shortcomings, especially vis-à-vis US dominance and extraterritorial legal risks (e.g., FISA, Cloud Act).

The compromise version (A–AZ) expands the scope dramatically—introducing 52 additional points, offering a broader, more granular and thematically diversified diagnosis. It shifts from purely problem-focused framing to a mixed tone that also highlights opportunities, resources, and EU initiatives.

The evolution from the draft to the compromise recitals shows a substantial expansion in both breadth and sophistication. Semiconductors, cybersecurity, and infrastructure were core concerns from the start and remained central. But the compromise transitions from a focused critique of technological dependence and strategic vulnerability to a comprehensive strategy document that positions technological sovereignty as a long-term, multi-actor effort embedded in EU industrial policy, digital trade, skills development, and regulatory reform.

This maturation reflects the EU Parliament’s ability to build political consensus while responding to evolving geopolitical realities, notably the rise of US-China tech rivalry and internal digital market challenges.

Technological Sovereignty

In its initial formulation, the draft report presented technological sovereignty primarily as the capacity for the European Union to control or master so-called “strategic technologies” deemed essential to its economic and political independence. This framing, while valid, remained largely defensive and focused on autonomy in critical technologies, implicitly reacting to perceived external threats and dependencies.

The compromise text significantly broadens and deepens this conceptualization. Rather than limiting sovereignty to a set of vital technologies, it now positions technological sovereignty as a dynamic capability embedded across the entire digital value chain. This includes not only research and innovation, but also industrial competitiveness, standard-setting, and participation in global market systems. This shift is made explicit in recitals A and D, where sovereignty is linked not just to independence, but to Europe's ability to build innovation ecosystems, ensure research excellence, and foster competitive industrial capabilities. Recital AV further consolidates this broader view, describing sovereignty as a multifaceted objective requiring coherence between R&D, industrial strategy, and digital leadership.

Importantly, the compromise introduces additional layers of strategic thinking. It recognizes the central role of standardisation—highlighted in recital AW—as a critical dimension of technological power. Standards are framed not merely as technical specifications, but as a form of geopolitical leverage, where Europe’s capacity to set global rules becomes a core asset of sovereignty. The role of international agreements is also elevated. Through recitals AX to AZ, the compromise introduces digital trade agreements as essential instruments for defending and projecting European values—such as privacy, security, and data fairness—in the global digital economy. These agreements, particularly with partners like South Korea and Singapore, are positioned as platforms for promoting European digital norms and reducing technological dependency.

Further emphasis is placed on market dynamics and innovation-driven competitiveness. The compromise moves beyond a protectionist stance and reframes sovereignty as the capacity to lead in global markets, scale technologies, and establish leadership in key technological domains. Sovereignty, in this sense, is no longer about erecting barriers, but about creating the economic conditions for digital innovation, driven by open competition, smart regulation, and strategic investments—an approach explicitly referenced in recitals A and AV.

Lastly, the compromise underscores the importance of Europe’s capacity to generate and retain world-class research and innovation outputs. Sovereignty is inseparable from scientific excellence, as noted in recital AV, which stresses the need to nurture cutting-edge research ecosystems, support industrial scale-up, and ensure that European innovations remain anchored within the Union’s industrial and social fabric.

In sum, technological sovereignty in the compromise version is no longer defined solely by what Europe must defend against, but by what it must build, lead, and shape. This transformation—spanning recitals A, D, AV, AW, AX–AZ—reflects a decisive shift from a defensive posture to a competitive and globally assertive vision. The EU is not only aiming to reduce its vulnerabilities but is also actively crafting a proactive industrial and digital strategy based on excellence, openness, and standard-setting power.

Dependency and Strategic Vulnerability

The initial draft report highlighted the EU’s structural dependence on foreign-controlled digital infrastructures, particularly those based in the United States. It pointed to legal exposure risks linked to extraterritorial surveillance regimes such as the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act (FISA) and the US Cloud Act, which allow US authorities to access data held by US companies even when stored in Europe. These concerns are preserved in the compromise, especially in recital B, which “stresses the strategic risk posed by the dependence of EU companies, institutions and citizens on non-EU technology providers, in particular with regard to cloud infrastructure and data governance.”

However, the compromise expands this analysis substantially, introducing a more systemic diagnosis of Europe’s digital vulnerability. Recital C quantifies this dependency, noting that “more than 80% of Europe’s digital services and infrastructure are currently reliant on non-EU technologies and intellectual property.” This figure moves the debate beyond security concerns toward broader questions of economic sovereignty and industrial resilience.

The compromise also incorporates a critique of market concentration and the dominance of global tech giants, which it links directly to Europe’s strategic weakness. In recital C, it is stated that “the current structure of the digital market, dominated by a small number of non-EU platforms, undermines the Union’s ability to control its digital future and weakens the negotiating power of EU firms and consumers.” This market asymmetry is portrayed not merely as a commercial challenge, but as a strategic vulnerability that affects the Union’s autonomy across sectors.

Moreover, the underperformance of the EU in strategic research and development is clearly identified as a structural gap. Recital F “notes with concern that only a fraction of global investment in software R&D takes place in Europe, leading to dependence on external technological capabilities and solutions.” This point ties technological dependency to insufficient innovation capacity, reinforcing the argument that sovereignty must be built through stronger internal capabilities.

Finally, the absence of sovereign digital infrastructure is singled out as a critical gap. Recital AF highlights “the lack of EU-owned and EU-operated data centres” and calls for the development of infrastructure that is “governed by European norms and aligned with Union values of data protection and strategic autonomy.” The recital also references the fragmentation of European initiatives and the risk of digital sovereignty being compromised by outsourcing foundational services to foreign providers.

Altogether, the compromise transforms the notion of dependency from a legal and infrastructural issue into a multidimensional strategic vulnerability—spanning data sovereignty, infrastructure control, market power, and technological capability. The use of hard data (80% reliance), policy critique (platform dominance), and calls for sovereign assets (EU-owned data centres) in recitals B, C, F, and AF illustrates a clear intent: to reposition digital dependency as a central obstacle to sovereignty, requiring a coordinated response across industrial, legal, and investment frameworks.

Digital Market Conditions and Fragmentation

While the initial draft merely acknowledged the issue of market fragmentation and the inefficiency of scattered public subsidies, the compromise text sharpens this diagnosis with quantitative evidence and policy prescriptions. It introduces a key economic indicator in recital I, which notes that “intra-EU trade in digital services accounts for only 8% of the Union’s GDP.” This figure starkly illustrates the underdevelopment of a truly integrated European digital market and serves as a clear benchmark of fragmentation.

The compromise goes further in recital J, where it “highlights the existence of multiple national digital regulations and infrastructures that hinder the creation of scale in the digital single market.” This fragmentation is no longer portrayed as a secondary inefficiency but rather as a core structural obstacle to digital sovereignty and competitiveness. It also recognizes that disparate national rules limit the scalability of digital businesses and increase compliance burdens, especially for start-ups and SMEs.

In response, the compromise sets out concrete tools to address this fragmentation, particularly through the promotion of interoperability, open standards, and open-source governance models. Recital M explicitly calls on Member States to “adopt and promote open source technologies and open standards across public administrations and procurement processes, following the principle of 'public money, public code'.” This reflects a shift in strategy: rather than merely lamenting regulatory heterogeneity, the report proposes actionable solutions rooted in openness, transparency, reusability, and digital sovereignty.

The same recital also encourages “the use of interoperable and modular software infrastructure,” aiming to reduce vendor lock-in and enable smoother cross-border digital services. This approach reframes open-source not only as a technical preference, but as a strategic choice to reduce dependency, foster innovation, and build public digital infrastructure aligned with European values.

Taken together, recitals I, J, and M mark a paradigm shift. Digital market fragmentation is no longer treated as an unavoidable side effect of subsidiarity or diversity, but as a strategic bottleneck that must be addressed through coordinated governance, technical alignment, and public-sector leadership. By advocating for interoperability, harmonised standards, and open digital ecosystems, the compromise lays out a more integrated, scalable, and sovereignty-oriented vision for the EU digital single market.

Infrastructure Gaps (5G, Fibre, HPC)

The initial draft already acknowledged Europe’s delays in deploying key digital infrastructures such as 5G and fibre-optic networks, along with its limited share in global semiconductor production. However, the compromise text goes significantly further, offering a detailed mapping of Europe’s critical digital infrastructure landscape and highlighting a broader set of technological dependencies and investment needs.

In recital H, the text establishes that “digital infrastructure, including very high-capacity networks, data centres, and edge computing, forms the backbone of the Union’s digital transition,” making the case that the gaps are not just technical, but strategic. This is reinforced in recital I, which flags the underdevelopment of “cross-border interconnectivity and high-performance computing (HPC)” as a serious bottleneck for digital sovereignty.

The compromise explicitly expands the scope of infrastructure to include submarine cables, satellite systems, radio spectrum, and quantum technologies, as noted in recital P, which “calls for targeted support to strategic infrastructure such as secure submarine cables, quantum communication networks, and EU-based cloud and satellite systems.” These elements are no longer considered peripheral but central to Europe’s industrial competitiveness and strategic autonomy.

A major innovation in the compromise is the sectoral integration of infrastructure planning. Recital N highlights the relevance of digital infrastructure for specific industries, stating that “connectivity gaps delay innovation and productivity gains in key sectors such as automotive, healthcare, and manufacturing,” with a particular mention of “connected and autonomous vehicles” as future use cases dependent on high-performance networks and low-latency systems.

The compromise also introduces new structural challenges, such as land access and permitting delays. Recital R points out that “digital infrastructure deployment is hindered by complex national rules on land access, administrative burdens, and the lack of harmonised procedures for network roll-out.” These issues are reframed as systemic bottlenecks, not just technical delays, and suggest the need for a regulatory reset to accelerate infrastructure deployment.

Investment shortfalls are addressed directly in recital Q, which “warns that the EU is at risk of falling behind due to insufficient public and private investment in next-generation infrastructure,” calling for stronger financial instruments and more effective use of existing funding mechanisms. This includes tapping into instruments like the Connecting Europe Facility, InvestEU, and national recovery funds for digital transformation.

Finally, the text introduces strategic infrastructure initiatives such as GOVSATCOM, referenced in recital S, which “stresses the need for a sovereign European governmental satellite communications programme to ensure secure and autonomous communications in crises and defence contexts.” This indicates a clear link between infrastructure development and EU security objectives.

Together, these recitals (H–P, N, Q, R, S) offer a comprehensive and multidimensional approach to Europe’s digital infrastructure gaps—one that goes well beyond diagnosis and points toward a forward-looking industrial and strategic investment roadmap. The compromise not only identifies critical technologies but also connects them to geopolitical autonomy, sectoral innovation, regulatory reform, and fiscal strategy.

Semiconductors & the Chips Act

In the initial draft, the discussion on semiconductors was limited to a brief observation that Europe accounts for only 10% of global chip production, with clear dominance from actors in East Asia, particularly Taiwan and China. The compromise text (recitals T–X) substantially expands and deepens this theme, transforming it into a central pillar of Europe’s digital sovereignty agenda.

First, the compromise criticises the current design of the EU Chips Act, arguing that it is too narrowly focused on next-generation “advanced nodes” and neglects more mature, widely used technologies. Recital V explicitly “calls for a revision of the Chips Act in 2026, in order to ensure that legacy technologies and mature nodes—still essential for most industrial supply chains—are sufficiently supported.” This marks a shift from purely cutting-edge ambition to a more realistic and supply-chain-oriented strategy.

The compromise also recognises the geostrategic vulnerability posed by the EU’s weak position in the semiconductor sector. Recital T underscores that “Europe’s dependency on foreign chip manufacturing poses a critical risk to the resilience of its digital and industrial ecosystems,” referencing recent global shortages that disrupted European automotive and electronics sectors. The recital links sovereignty directly to domestic manufacturing capacity, not only in advanced chips but also in older-generation components that remain vital across industries.

A key policy lever introduced in the compromise is the development of regional semiconductor clusters. Recital W “encourages Member States to build and support competitive regional ecosystems for semiconductor design, testing, and manufacturing,” highlighting the importance of decentralised yet networked hubs of excellence. This approach seeks to leverage local strengths while fostering cross-border synergies, contributing to strategic autonomy through industrial cohesion.

In parallel, the compromise updates the notion of technological criticality, expanding beyond CPUs to include a broader range of essential components. Recital X specifically mentions “GPUs, legacy chips, and quantum processors” as technologies that should be considered critical for Europe’s digital future. The inclusion of GPUs reflects the increasing importance of AI workloads and high-performance computing, while quantum chips are seen as foundational for the next wave of innovation.

Collectively, recitals T–X reposition Europe’s semiconductor policy from a narrow industrial ambition to a strategic capability agenda, rooted in both innovation and resilience. The text highlights a dual-track strategy: investing in frontier technologies while ensuring Europe has the capacity to produce and retain control over essential hardware across all levels of the value chain. By calling for a revision of the Chips Act (V), support for regional clusters (W), and an expanded list of critical components (X), the compromise lays the groundwork for a more balanced, sovereign, and forward-looking semiconductor policy.

AI and Cloud Infrastructure

Artificial intelligence was barely mentioned in the initial draft, remaining a secondary concern. The compromise text, however, elevates AI to a strategic priority, introducing a dedicated set of recitals (AA–AD, Y–Z) that lay the groundwork for a sovereign European AI ecosystem supported by cloud infrastructure and public computing resources.

The compromise presents a vision of democratized AI development, starting with the idea of AI “gigafactories”—large-scale infrastructure combining computing power, data access, and R&D capacity. Recital AB introduces this concept by “calling for the creation of European AI gigafactories to support the training, deployment, and scaling of large AI models, in line with European values and industrial capabilities.” These gigafactories are conceived not just as technical hubs, but as sovereign infrastructure, critical to ensuring that Europe remains a competitive player in the global AI race.

A key equity concern is the unequal access to compute resources between large tech firms and smaller European actors. To address this, recital AA “stresses the need to provide SMEs, start-ups and research institutions with access to public compute infrastructure and data resources,” identifying compute access as a structural enabler of innovation and inclusion. This marks a significant shift from a market-led model to a public infrastructure approach to AI development.

The compromise also identifies a competitive disadvantage stemming from asynchronous deployment timelines. Recital AC warns that “European consumers and businesses face delayed access to AI services compared to users in other regions due to regulatory uncertainty and lack of infrastructure.” This gap is framed as both an economic and strategic liability, reinforcing the need for timely and sovereign deployment mechanisms within the EU.

In terms of cloud infrastructure, the compromise endorses a federated model. Rather than aiming to replicate the hypercentralised architectures of non-EU cloud giants, recital Z “promotes federated cloud frameworks that link regional and national infrastructures while ensuring compliance with EU values, cybersecurity, and data protection standards.” This model allows for local control, data sovereignty, and ecosystem resilience—all while fostering interoperability across Member States.

Moreover, recital AD reinforces the idea that digital sovereignty in AI is not only about algorithms, but about infrastructure, compute, data governance, and talent. The recital links AI deployment to broader questions of industrial strategy, calling for “a coordinated investment plan to develop sovereign AI infrastructure aligned with the Green Deal and Digital Decade objectives.”

Together, recitals AA–AD and Y–Z represent a strategic repositioning of AI and cloud policy: from regulatory anxiety to proactive, infrastructure-led sovereignty building. The compromise envisions a European AI landscape that is open, inclusive, federated, and competitive—anchored in shared public goods, regional ecosystems, and sovereignty-preserving infrastructures. This reflects a broader commitment to ensuring that the means of AI production—not just its outputs—remain within the democratic and strategic control of the Union.

Cybersecurity and Resilience

The original draft flagged high rates of cyberattacks across Member States, citing statistics from countries like Germany and France (recitals G–H), but offered limited strategic framing. The compromise text (recitals AI, AJ, AK) moves decisively beyond this descriptive approach, proposing a comprehensive and systemic vision of cybersecurity, grounded in resilience, infrastructure security, and geopolitical awareness.

A key development in the compromise is the recognition that cybersecurity is not merely a technical concern, but a strategic pillar of sovereignty. Recital AJ states clearly that “cybersecurity and resilience are not optional add-ons, but essential prerequisites for Europe’s digital transition and strategic autonomy.” This shift reframes cybersecurity as a foundational element of the digital ecosystem, interlinked with industrial policy, data protection, and critical infrastructure.

The text also elevates existing tools, such as the EU 5G Security Toolbox, which is cited in recital AJ as “a model for coordinated risk assessment and mitigation strategies that should be extended to other critical infrastructures.” By referencing the toolbox as a scalable governance mechanism, the compromise signals the need for a coherent EU-level cybersecurity architecture, beyond the fragmented national frameworks.

One particularly notable addition is the explicit focus on submarine cables, highlighted in recital AI, which “draws attention to the physical vulnerabilities of undersea cable infrastructure that underpins global data flows, and calls for coordinated EU action to protect these assets from disruption or foreign interference.” This reflects growing geopolitical awareness of the infrastructure layer of digital sovereignty, and echoes recent concerns over sabotage, espionage, or extraterritorial control.

The compromise also addresses the security of cloud services and data centres, which are often overlooked in traditional cyber strategies. Recital AK emphasizes “the urgent need to ensure the cybersecurity of digital infrastructure, including EU-based data centres, edge computing nodes, and federated cloud systems.” It calls for both technical hardening and governance-level protection, reinforcing the idea that resilience must be built into all layers—from fibre optics to satellite links to software platforms.

Collectively, recitals AI, AJ, and AK articulate a shift from reactive cybersecurity toward a strategic resilience model. The compromise acknowledges that digital sovereignty cannot be achieved without securing both the physical and logical layers of Europe’s infrastructure stack. Cybersecurity is no longer framed as a threat management issue alone, but as an enabler of trust, competitiveness, and autonomy across the entire digital value chain.

Energy Costs and Sustainability

The initial draft report made only a passing reference to the impact of high energy costs on the competitiveness of Europe’s digital infrastructure. The compromise text, however, elevates this issue to a strategic concern, integrating energy consumption into the broader debate on digital sovereignty and industrial planning.

Recital AN introduces a quantitative perspective that anchors the discussion in concrete foresight: it “warns that data centres in Europe could consume up to three times more energy by 2030 compared to 2022, representing a significant and growing share of total electricity demand.” This projection transforms energy from a background variable into a central constraint and planning factor for Europe’s digital strategy.

The recital goes on to link this growing consumption to wider sustainability goals, stating that “digital infrastructure development must be aligned with the Union’s climate neutrality objectives, in particular through increased energy efficiency, waste heat reuse, and prioritisation of green electricity.” This reflects a key strategic shift: rather than viewing energy simply as a cost variable, the compromise positions it as a dual lever for both competitiveness and ecological transition.

Recital AO further reinforces this approach by calling on policymakers to “integrate energy consumption forecasts into all major digital infrastructure investment decisions and ensure coherence with the Green Deal Industrial Plan and REPowerEU.” This marks a move toward predictive and cross-sectoral policy-making, where energy strategy and digital infrastructure are no longer treated in isolation, but as mutually reinforcing domains.

The text also signals concern over regional disparities in energy pricing and access, which could affect the viability of large-scale data centres and AI compute nodes in certain parts of Europe. Though not spelled out in detail, this logic supports the emerging theme of infrastructure as an ecosystem, where variables like energy, land use, compute access, and sustainability must be planned together.

Together, recitals AN and AO articulate a new direction in EU digital policy: one that embraces energy usage not merely as a constraint, but as a strategic planning metric. By projecting forward to 2030 and aligning digital development with green policy frameworks, the compromise represents a clear move toward a sustainable, resilient, and energy-conscious model of digital sovereignty.

Skills, Workforce and Talent

Completely absent from the initial draft, the issue of digital skills and talent development emerges in the compromise as a major new pillar of digital sovereignty. The text underscores that sovereignty cannot be achieved through infrastructure and regulation alone—it must also be grounded in human capital and the capacity to train, attract, and retain digital professionals.

The scale of the challenge is clearly quantified. Recital AP “warns that the EU is on track to face a shortfall of up to 12 million ICT professionals by 2030, significantly below the Digital Decade target of 20 million.” This projected gap highlights a structural weakness in Europe’s digital economy: without sufficient skilled professionals, even well-funded infrastructures and sovereign technologies risk underperformance.

The compromise links this skills gap to the broader industrial and innovation agenda, stating in recital AQ that “Europe’s competitiveness in artificial intelligence, cybersecurity, semiconductors, and cloud computing depends critically on its ability to develop a digitally skilled workforce.” Here, talent is not treated as a social issue or educational concern alone—it is framed as a strategic resource essential to Europe's ability to execute its digital ambitions.

Importantly, the compromise also recognizes new global dynamics in tech employment. Recital AR notes that “recent waves of layoffs in major non-EU tech firms present an opportunity for Europe to attract highly qualified professionals, provided that immigration, tax, and employment frameworks are adapted to support talent inflows.” This marks a shift from purely internal capacity-building to external talent attraction, suggesting that Europe's openness can serve sovereignty, if paired with strategic policy tools.

Further emphasis is placed on STEM education and the inclusion of underrepresented groups. Recital AT “calls for stronger investment in STEM education at all levels, with particular efforts to increase participation among women and underrepresented communities.” This aligns digital sovereignty with social inclusion and educational reform, reinforcing the idea that sovereignty must be broadly distributed and socially embedded, not concentrated in elite institutions or urban hubs.

Finally, the compromise frames reskilling and upskilling as part of the broader transition. Recital AS highlights the role of “lifelong learning ecosystems” and links digital training to broader industrial policies, especially for workers in sectors undergoing automation or digital transformation.

Taken together, recitals AP to AT reposition digital skills as a critical enabler of strategic autonomy. The compromise makes clear that digital sovereignty is not just a matter of code or chips—it is also a matter of people. Through a combination of education, talent attraction, inclusion, and labour mobility, the EU is called upon to build its own digital workforce, capable of sustaining innovation and reducing structural dependencies over the long term.

Standardisation and Trade

Entirely absent from the initial draft, the topics of technical standardisation and digital trade agreements are introduced in the compromise as core instruments of EU technological sovereignty. This marks a strategic shift toward a geo-economic framing of digital power, where the ability to shape global rules is seen as just as important as building infrastructure or reducing dependencies.

Recital AW lays the foundation for this shift, stating that “standardisation is an essential tool for digital sovereignty and must be actively promoted by the Union in emerging fields such as artificial intelligence, quantum computing, cybersecurity, and cloud technologies.” It goes further to position standards as a source of influence, calling on the EU to “engage more assertively in international standard-setting bodies to defend its values and technological autonomy.” This reframes standardisation from a technical afterthought to a strategic battleground, particularly in competition with the U.S. and China.

In parallel, the compromise incorporates digital trade policy as a pillar of sovereignty. Recital AX highlights recent progress, welcoming “the conclusion of digital trade agreements with partners such as South Korea and Singapore,” which are seen as frameworks for data protection, interoperability, and market access aligned with EU principles. These agreements are not only about commercial expansion—they are about embedding European norms in the global digital order.

Recital AY reinforces this approach by emphasising the need for coherence between data sovereignty and open digital markets. It states that “the EU must defend the free flow of data in its external trade policy, while ensuring high standards of privacy, cybersecurity, and ethical AI.” This reflects a balancing act between openness and control: the Union seeks to be a global trade actor without compromising on its core regulatory values.

Crucially, recital AZ links trade and standardisation back to the strategic autonomy agenda, calling for the EU to “develop a cohesive external digital policy that uses trade, standards, and diplomacy to strengthen its global positioning in technology.” This is a clear articulation of geo-economic sovereignty: a vision where Europe asserts itself not only through internal capabilities, but also through rule-shaping beyond its borders.

Together, recitals AW to AZ establish that technological sovereignty is no longer confined to domestic capacities or defensive policies. It is also about projecting norms, securing supply chains, and building strategic alliances through trade and standards. By embedding sovereignty in the language of international cooperation, the compromise reflects a mature and outward-facing EU strategy, one that recognises that rules, not just resources, shape the digital world.

In sum, the compromise text transforms a political warning into a genuine industrial and technological strategy document, covering a comprehensive spectrum—from submarine cables to trade agreements, from energy consumption to talent shortages, from standards to AI gigafactories. It no longer merely identifies shortcomings but lays out an ambitious and multidimensional roadmap for the European Union’s digital sovereignty.

Conclusion : three implicit counter-reports

What might have been the “Knafo report” has ultimately lost its parentage. The final document, far from being the work of a single author, is a compromise: the original draft has been merged with amendment contributions that amount to almost three competing counter-reports, all now woven into the initial text.

If these amendments are ultimately adopted, the final version of the report will no longer function as a reflection of the political agenda originally proposed by Sarah Knafo. Instead, it will emerge as a hybrid platform—a shared institutional output whose visible form remains intact, but whose substance has been reshaped by a distinct ideological imprint.

It will cease to be a “Knafo report” in the strict sense, becoming instead a Parliament-wide document shaped significantly by the structuring vision of the PPE, Renew, S&D and Greens group.

The Jörgen Warborn counter-report

The amendments tabled by Jörgen Warborn—whether authored individually or co-signed with Renew and S&D colleagues—constitute far more than a series of technical refinements to the draft report led by Sarah Knafo. Taken together, they amount to a coherent, structured, and ideologically distinct intervention across the entire text. Their scope, thematic consistency, and line-by-line insertion throughout the resolution’s architecture give them the form and function of what may legitimately be called a “Warborn counter-report.”

Unlike amendments that merely seek clarification or adjustment, these proposals reconstruct the draft report’s political trajectory. By systematically engaging with each of its components—from the recitals and diagnostic sections to legislative guidance and strategic recommendations—Warborn’s contributions gradually reorient the report’s meaning while maintaining the outward appearance of iterative enhancement. This technique of embedded rewriting operates not through overt rupture, but through cumulative redirection, effectively shifting the report’s ideological centre of gravity.

At the structural level, Warborn’s amendments span multiple axes. They introduce substantial deletions of key passages originally focused on digital sovereignty, public intervention in critical technologies, and restrictive regulation of dominant digital actors. In their place, they propose a more market-driven, competition-friendly and open innovation framework. References to European autonomy or industrial protection are often softened, redirected toward global competitiveness, or substituted by language more aligned with a deregulatory digital single market logic.

Crucially, this work does not exist in isolation. Warborn’s amendments are nested within a broader coalition effort, supported notably by elements within the Renew group and the more centrist strands of S&D. Together, they reflect a deliberate attempt to construct a politically viable alternative to the original framing of the report, which had leaned more heavily on state-centred sovereignty, strategic autonomy, and a precautionary approach to digital infrastructure. In this sense, the Warborn counter-report offers not a rejection of the original, but a reappropriation—recasting its structure and vocabulary while reversing its political intent.

This strategic layering produces a hybrid result. The “Knafo report,” in formal terms, retains the name and basic scaffolding of the original draft, but its political DNA has been overwritten. What began as a sovereignist initiative grounded in the language of resilience, autonomy, and critical infrastructure has been transformed into a policy vehicle for a more liberalised, transnationally cooperative, and innovation-driven vision of European tech policy. Key terms—such as "sovereignty," "infrastructure," and "strategic independence"—remain in the text, but are redeployed in service of a fundamentally different agenda.

This manoeuvre is emblematic of the internal dynamics of own-initiative reports in the European Parliament, particularly in contested domains like digital sovereignty and industrial strategy. These reports, while non-legislative, play a key agenda-setting role. Their authorship can serve as a symbolic claim to leadership in a given policy field. Yet, as the Warborn amendments demonstrate, such symbolic capital is not guaranteed. Through a combination of procedural leverage, amendment density, and cross-group alliances, a counter-project can be layered onto the original text, neutralising its authorship and replacing its core narrative without triggering formal replacement.

The Warborn counter-report thus functions not only as a set of technical contributions, but as an act of political displacement. It substitutes one vision of Europe’s digital future—sovereign, state-driven, and resilient—with another—market-based, interoperable, and competition-oriented. What remains on the surface is the structure of a unified parliamentary report. But beneath that structure lies a quiet but decisive ideological reconfiguration, marking the institutional crystallisation of a centrist coalition’s digital strategy.

The Murillo-Geese Counter-Report

The counter-report proposed by Alexandra Geese (Greens/EFA) is not a mere peripheral addition to the original text, but a strategic overhaul of its foundations. Through a dense set of amendments—many of which appear in the very first articles (notably 1a to 1t)—Geese does not simply correct or adjust. She builds an alternative political project: an eco-techno-sovereign vision rooted in transparency, openness, and digital autonomy anchored in European law. This work does not rearrange the original structure—it relocates its ideological architecture.

At the heart of this reorientation lies a redefinition of digital sovereignty, no longer conceived as a question of competitiveness or security alone, but as a legal, ethical, and democratic issue. Amendments 65 and 74 clearly set the tone: combatting legal extraterritoriality imposed by instruments such as the Cloud Act, rejecting any provider subject to foreign legal regimes (1g, 1h), and affirming the need for infrastructures fully under European jurisdiction (1r). What is at stake is no longer just technological performance, but the Union’s political capacity to ensure its normative autonomy.

This legal sovereignty is coupled with a proposal for open industrialisation, based on principles of federation, interoperability, and transparency. The explicit support for a European cloud that is open and interoperable (1c, 1f), combined with proactive regulation to limit the power of hyperscalers (165, 166), outlines an alternative industrial model to that of concentrated digital capitalism. Geese defends a decentralised ecosystem, in which digital commons—especially open-source code (1t, 183)—become the foundation of a new public technological order.

This order does not separate the digital agenda from the ecological transition. On the contrary, it integrates it systemically. Amendments 1l and 1k call for a significant reduction in data center energy consumption and for the circularity of materials (notably semiconductors), in direct alignment with the objectives of the European Green Deal (Am. Cd). Sovereignty, in this configuration, is as environmental as it is technological.

The counter-report also introduces a critical perspective on current market dynamics. By proposing a reform of competition rules (1b) and supporting local innovation (1a, 1m), it seeks to rebalance an ecosystem dominated by concentration and predatory acquisitions. This is not a call for autarky, but for strategic diversification guided by the public interest.

Finally, Geese puts forward concrete instruments to strengthen European capacities, including the launch of a €10 billion tech sovereign fund (1s), and ambitious measures to address the talent gap (1p, 1q), notably through education, targeted immigration, and support for public research.

What distinguishes the Geese counter-report is not only its content, but also its mode of intervention. Echoing the strategy of Elena Sancho Murillo, Geese inserts her counter-model at the heart of the existing institutional framework, without directly rejecting it. Through a series of strategically positioned amendments, she saturates the original text with new purposes, progressively transforming it into a vehicle for a different vision of Europe’s digital future. This is a textbook case of discursive integration by saturation, in which the form remains intact, but the substance is rewritten.

The more than 80 amendments submitted by Elena Sancho Murillo—many co-signed by members of the S&D group and frequently backed by Renew and the Greens—form not a peripheral layer of additions, but a full-scale counter-proposal embedded within the original report authored by Sarah Knafo.

Far from being a collection of technical tweaks, these amendments represent a strategically structured intervention: an ideologically grounded alternative that rewrites the initial political narrative from the inside out.

This work articulates a fundamentally different vision of European digital sovereignty than the one underpinning the Knafo draft. Where Knafo’s framework tends to combine security imperatives with a liberal-industrial logic focused on competitiveness and resilience, Sancho Murillo’s approach is anchored in values of social justice, environmental responsibility, and democratic governance. Her amendments reframe the idea of technological sovereignty around public stewardship, fair investment, inclusive access, and ecological sustainability.

Amendments such as 66, 2e f, 2g, and 3z lay the conceptual groundwork for this alternative paradigm. Rather than prioritising market efficiency or industrial concentration, Sancho Murillo proposes a vision of sovereignty that emphasises territorial equity, protection of public goods, and state capacity to guide long-term digital development. The vocabulary of her interventions systematically references strategic planning instruments like the Draghi and Letta reports or the Digital Decade objectives, underscoring a preference for coordinated and mission-oriented governance over market spontaneity.

At the operational level, the set of amendments proposes concrete mechanisms for implementing this vision. These include calls for massive public investment in green digital infrastructure, specific energy planning for data centres, and climate-compatible design of fibre and mobile networks (as developed in amendments 274 to 278). The digital transition is not separated from the energy and environmental transition, but integrated with it as a joint strategy. Sovereignty, in this perspective, is not only geopolitical—it is ecological, infrastructural, and civic.

What distinguishes this strategy is its mode of insertion. Rather than openly confronting the original report’s assumptions, Sancho Murillo’s amendments build an alternative architecture within it, progressively shifting its ideological foundation through volume, density, and narrative reframing. This is a case of what could be termed integration by saturation—a discursive annexation whereby the original structure is retained, but its meaning is reconstituted. Through deliberate over-writing, the initial Knafo report becomes the host for a fundamentally S&D-driven programme.

This approach mirrors, in method if not in content, the strategy employed by Jörgen Warborn and his allies. However, where Warborn redirected the text toward market openness, technological liberalism, and deregulation, Sancho Murillo orients it toward public interest, sustainability, and socio-digital justice. Both deploy amendment-based strategies to transform the report from within, but toward opposing political ends.

In parallel, the counter-report proposed by Alexandra Geese (Greens/EFA) reinforces this dynamic by introducing an ecologist, open source-oriented and anti-dependence narrative. Geese calls for a sovereignty rooted in decentralisation, transparency, and ecological responsibility, severing ties with foreign-dominated infrastructures and reorienting industrial policy toward the common good. Her contributions, like those of Sancho Murillo, do not simply edit—they reframe.

Together, these counter-reports do not oppose the Knafo draft head-on; they exceed it, embedding alternative agendas within the same institutional frame. This dynamic illustrates a broader truth of European parliamentary procedure: authorship is not guaranteed by designation, but contested through amendment. In this case, the Knafo report becomes the canvas for competing visions of Europe’s digital future—liberal, social-democratic, and ecologist—each vying to inscribe their strategic narrative into the policy record.

Through this work, the initial report becomes a battleground for conflicting visions: on one side, industrial and liberal sovereignty; on the other, open, ecological, and civic sovereignty, oriented toward the commons. If these amendments are ultimately adopted, the final text will cease to reflect the original paradigm. Instead, it will bear the clear imprint of an ecologist and federalist ambition, deeply aligned with the principles of a digital policy serving society rather than the market.

An Integrated “PFE Counter-Report” in Service of Assertive Techno-Sovereigntism

Amendment tabled by the Patriotes pour l’Europe (PFE) operates as an ideological marker consistent with the group’s nationalist-liberal DNA: it defends national sovereignty, criticises what it views as Brussels-driven bureaucratic over-reach, and favours regulatory flexibility. The text signals a deliberate break with EU-level centralisation in technology governance, framing deregulation as the pathway to economic recovery and rejecting pan-European industrial coordination.

Although isolated, the proposal forms the first building block of an embryonic “PFE counter-report” built around a sovereignist, market-liberal vision that prioritises national instruments over shared European projects.

Under the guise of strengthening digital sovereignty, the PFE amendments reveal a clear objective: to refocus strategic levers in the hands of Member States; to reindustrialise Europe around its critical infrastructures; to dismantle dependencies on extra-European powers; and to reaffirm the primacy of national sovereignty over any logic of European integration.

Renationalisation of Digital Sovereignty
The PFE rejects any notion of Union-level technological sovereignty in favour of Member States, advocating for a reinforced intergovernmental role (Am. 63, 70).
European sovereignty is conceived here as a sum of national sovereignties, not as a collective project.

Assertive Protectionism and “Hard” Reindustrialisation
National and European preference in strategic public procurement is clearly expressed (Am. 6).
The text promotes heavy nuclear investment, strategic recycling, and massive-scale automation (Am. 13a, 13b, 457).
Environmental standards seen as detrimental to competitiveness are outright rejected (Am. 459).

Explicit Hostility Toward Major Platforms and EU Regulation
The dominance of American actors in cloud, content, and network infrastructure is denounced (Am. 80, 99, 100). There are calls to curtail the power of the GAFAMs through financial contributions (“fair share”) and reinforced regulatory oversight (Am. 353). European law is sharply criticised for being overly restrictive, overly centralised, and overly technocratic (Am. 419, 430). The “Nikolic counter-report,” embedded within this package of amendments, represents far more than a series of technical changes: it sketches out an alternative vision of Europe’s digital future—centred on the nation, heavy industry, and a radical distrust of European integration and global dependencies.

Towards Techno-Sovereigntism ? Between Open Markets and the Reassertion of the Nation-State

There will therefore be no “Knafo report.”

But this symbolic absence in no way implies the political disappearance of its rapporteur. On the contrary, the latest amendments tabled by Sarah Knafo to the gas regulation reveal a clear, structured and now unambiguous position: one of an assertive energy sovereignty, based on the primacy of Member States and on an explicit refusal of any binding centralisation imposed by the Commission.

These proposals are not mere technical or marginal additions. They constitute a fully-fledged doctrinal bloc, each article of which affirms the same fundamental principle: that Member States must retain exclusive sovereignty in the definition, implementation, and adaptation of their own energy, technological, and industrial strategy.

Three main strands emerge from this series of amendments. The first rests on the assertion of the primacy of national sovereignties in the development of storage policies. Thus, Amendment 2a specifies that each Member State must be free to adapt its national storage strategy, taking account of its particular circumstances — be it its energy mix, bilateral supply partnerships, or technical capacities. In the same vein, Amendment 3a stipulates that each State should be able to unilaterally depart from the set filling targets, without needing prior approval from the European Commission.

The second strand highlights the rejection of any logic of centralisation via uniform European mechanisms. Amendment 7a provides that Member States may replace physical storage with other sovereign means of securing supply, such as long-term supply partnerships, which are to be considered equivalent. Furthermore, Amendment 7d reaffirms that the use of the AggregateEU mechanism must remain entirely voluntary and must under no circumstances become a precondition for accessing other European instruments. Amendment 7c also clarifies that Member States must be able to prioritise solutions compatible with their own national energy strategies, whether based on nuclear, biogas, hydrogen, or other freely chosen options.

Lastly, the third strand aims to formally circumscribe the powers of the Commission. Amendment 7b establishes that if a Member State persistently deviates from its filling plan, it may simply inform the Commission, which is only authorised to issue a non-binding recommendation. Moreover, such a recommendation must take account of national specificities and market conditions. A final amendment goes even further, arguing that any extension or adjustment of filling obligations beyond 31 December 2025 may only be considered with the explicit consent of each Member State. It also affirms that the definition and implementation of measures to ensure gas supply fall exclusively within the remit of the States, and that the Commission holds no authority to impose binding requirements that might restrict or override national energy policies.

Taken as a whole, these amendments form a particularly coherent doctrinal base, hostile to any form of imposed centralisation or supranationality, and assert without ambiguity the energy sovereignty of Member States.

It remains to be seen whether this orientation will be confirmed in the months to come, particularly in the run-up to national elections. Sarah Knafo appears to position herself at the intersection of an avowed liberalism — favourable to market openness, private capital mobilisation, and regulatory simplification — and a pragmatic sovereigntism — keen to preserve the State’s strategic levers. In this way, she embodies a structural tension within today’s European right, torn between a legacy ordoliberalism still compatible with integration, and a growing critique of the Commission’s interventionism, heightened since 2019.

The fault lines therefore remain fluid, and the political balance unstable. That is why we will continue to closely follow the evolution of Ms Knafo — not only as a parliamentarian, but also as a figure attempting to reconcile a dual anchoring, both national and European. Whether or not she manages to reconcile these two dimensions will partly determine the credibility of a conservative right capable of advancing a coherent “techno-sovereignist” vision at the continental scale.

1. https://www.google.com/url?sa=t&source=web&rct=j&opi=89978449&url=https://x.com/cre_sciencespo&ved=2ahUKEwjDhOXPo7SOAxUwfaQEHWorMc8QFnoECAMQAQ&usg=AOvVaw2ATHmcU6cag3OMb7IqgRuO

2. https://clio-texte.clionautes.org/chirac-appel-de-cochin-6-decembre-1978.html

This text by Jacques Chirac, former Prime Minister under Valéry Giscard d’Estaing, President of the Rassemblement pour la République (RPR) and then Mayor of Paris, was published on 6 December 1978. It was drafted with the advice of his two closest advisors: Pierre Juillet and Marie-France Garaud. This declaration was issued in the run-up to the European elections of June 1979, the first to be held by direct universal suffrage.

It went down in history as the “Cochin Appeal”, named after Jacques Chirac’s hospitalisation at the Cochin Hospital in Paris following an accident.

The Cochin Appeal

“There are grave moments in the history of a people when its very survival depends on its ability to discern the threats that are being concealed from it.”

The Europe we were awaiting and desiring — one in which a dignified and strong France might flourish — this Europe, we now know as of yesterday, is not the one that is being made. Everything leads us to believe that, behind the mask of words and the jargon of the technocrats, what is being prepared is the subjugation of France, the acceptance of her decline.

As far as we are concerned, we must say NO.

In plain terms, what is at stake? The facts are simple, even if some believe they gain by clouding them. The upcoming election of the European Assembly by direct universal suffrage cannot take place without the French people being directly informed of the real significance of their vote. It will be a trap if voters are led to believe they are merely endorsing a few general principles — which are broadly uncontroversial in terms of the necessity of European organisation — when, in reality, the votes so obtained will serve to legitimise both future excesses and present failings, to the detriment of national interests.

1. The French government asserts that the powers of the Assembly will remain defined by the Treaty of Rome and will not be altered by the new method of election. Yet most of our partners take the opposite view as self-evident, and no guarantees have been secured against this calmly pre-announced offensive. The President of the Republic has rightly acknowledged, in a recent press conference, that a federal Europe would inevitably be dominated by American interests. This means that majority voting within European institutions, by paralysing France’s will, will serve neither French interests — obviously — nor European ones. In other words, the votes of the 81 French representatives will carry little weight against the 329 representatives of countries themselves overly sensitive to transatlantic influence. This is the threat of which public opinion must be made aware. It is neither distant nor theoretical: it is open, certain, and imminent. How can our rulers hope to resist it tomorrow if they are incapable of even having it set aside in declarations of intent today?

2. Approval of the government’s European policy would require that this policy be clearly asserted with regard to the current failings of the European Economic Community. It is a fact that this Community — apart from a Common Agricultural Policy, which is itself under threat — today tends to be little more than a free-trade zone, perhaps favourable to the strongest foreign interests, but which condemns vast sectors of our industry to dismantling, left defenceless against unequal, unregulated competition or partners unwilling to grant us reciprocity. The French people cannot be asked to thus consent to their own economic servitude, to stagnation, and to unemployment. Insofar as the French government’s own economic policy contributes to the same outcomes, it too cannot be endorsed under the guise of a vote on Europe.

3. The admission of Spain and Portugal to the Community raises, both in terms of our agricultural interests and the functioning of the common institutions, extremely serious difficulties that must be resolved beforehand — lest they worsen an already unsatisfactory situation. Until then, to announce such admission as virtually assured, for the sake of some illusory political gain, would be extremely reckless.

4. The European policy of the government can in no way relieve France of the need for a foreign policy of her own. Europe must not be used to mask the fading of a France that would no longer have authority, ideas, a message, or even a face on the world stage. We reject a foreign policy that no longer responds to the vocation of a great power, a permanent member of the United Nations Security Council, and thus entrusted with specific responsibilities in the international order.

That is why we say NO.

NO to the politics of supranationality.
NO to economic servitude.
NO to the international erasure of France.

Favourable to European organisation? Yes, we fully are. We want, as much as anyone, for Europe to be built. But a truly European Europe, where France leads her destiny as a great nation. We say no to a vassal France in an empire of merchants, no to a France that resigns today only to vanish tomorrow.

Since what is at stake is France, her independence, her future — and since what is at stake is Europe, its cohesion and its will — we will not compromise. We shall fight with all our strength so that, after so many sacrifices, so many trials, so many examples, our generation does not, in ignorance, sign the decline of the fatherland.

As always when it comes to the degradation of France, the party of the foreigner is hard at work — with its calm and reassuring voice. Frenchmen, do not listen to it. It is the numbness that comes before the peace of death.

But as always, when it is a question of France’s honour, men will rise up everywhere to fight the partisans of surrender and the auxiliaries of decline. With solemnity and resolve, I call upon you — in a great gathering of hope — to a new battle: for the France that endures, and the Europe of tomorrow.”

— Statement by Jacques Chirac, 6 December 1978, “Cochin Appeal”

3. https://www.interstis.fr/notre-histoire/

4. https://www.openinternetproject.eu/

5. https://www.rapid.space/

6. https://whaller.com/fr

7. https://piit.org.pl/partnerzy/lewiatan

8. https://eur-lex.europa.eu/eli/dir/2022/2555/oj/eng

9. https://eur-lex.europa.eu/eli/reg/2025/38/oj/eng

10. https://eur-lex.europa.eu/eli/reg/2024/2847/oj/eng

11. https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=CELEX:52024DC0081

12. https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=celex%3A32011L0096

13. https://eur-lex.europa.eu/eli/reg/2019/943/oj/eng

14. https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=planjo:20140612-025

15. https://www.forbes.com/sites/heatherwishartsmith/2024/07/19/the-semiconductor-crisis-addressing-chip-shortages-and-security/

16. https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/HTML/?uri=CELEX:12008E004#:~:text=4.,being%20prevented%20from%20exercising%20theirs.

17. https://eur-lex.europa.eu/eli/reg/2019/881/oj eliuri=eli%3Areg%3A2019%3A881%3Aoj&locale=en

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23. https://eur-lex.europa.eu/eli/reg/2023/2854/oj/eng

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25. https://eur-lex.europa.eu/eli/reg/2024/903/oj/eng

26. https://eur-lex.europa.eu/eli/reg/2024/1183/oj/eng

27. https://eur-lex.europa.eu/eli/reg/2024/1689/oj/eng

28. https://eur-lex.europa.eu/eli/dir/2018/1972/oj/eng

29. https://www.cedefop.europa.eu/en/tools/vet-glossary/glossary/informatie-en-communicatietechnologie-ict-vaardigheden

30. https://www.euro-stack.info/docs/EuroStack_2025.pdf

31. https://www.digital-networks-act.com/

32. https://defence-industry-space.ec.europa.eu/eu-space/iris2-secure-connectivity_en

33. https://eur-lex.europa.eu/EN/legal-content/summary/the-establishment-of-the-european-digital-identity-framework-including-the-provision-of-european-digital-identity-wallets-and-trust-services.html?fromSummary=31

34. https://commission.europa.eu/law/law-making-process/better-regulation_en

35. https://op.europa.eu/en/publication-detail/-/publication/d74556a2-4ba0-11ee-9220-01aa75ed71a1/language-en

36. https://www.europarl.europa.eu/cmsdata/296134/2025.06.05_item%2021_S.%20MARCUS%20and%20A.%20THOMADAKIS_28th%20Regime%20JURI%20presentation05June2025%20v4.pdf

37. https://energy.ec.europa.eu/topics/nuclear-energy/small-modular-reactors_en

38. https://interoperable-europe.ec.europa.eu/collection/common-assessment-method-standards-and-specifications-camss/solution/elap/technology-neutrality#:~:text=Laws%20and%20regulations%20do%20not,%2C%20developers%2C%20suppliers%20and%20distributors.

39. https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/HTML/?uri=CELEX:52025JC0009

40. https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/cs/STATEMENT_22_5543

41. https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/memo_18_2764